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India's relations with the United States have 
followed a zig-zag course in the last fifty years. 
Sometimes warmers, sometimes more troubled, occasionally 
abrasive, frequently soured by divergent perceptions, 
interest and foreign policy courses, the relationship 
is marked, if not marred by instability and 
fluctuations. The needle has occasionally swayed 
between harsh criticisms, exception of parallelism of 
interests and policies of benign and sometimes not so 
benign tolerance. 
Although India and America had started off well, 
as India was fascinated by the American declaration of 
independence and aspired for the American ideals of 
progress and democracy, but soon their relations became 
subject to stress and strains due to difference of 
views regarding non-alignment, nature of communist 
threat and maintenance of peace and security. They also 
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differ on their approaches to the cold war, economic 
dissimilarities, nuclear non-proliferation treaty, 
Kashmir issue and more significantly United States 
massive economic and military support to Pakistan to 
contain the spread of Soviet influence in the region. 
This caused concern and anxieties in India. Not that 
there was lack of any will and effort on both sides to 
put their relations on an even keel what seemed to have 
queered their pitch was the ingrained proclivity in 
the United States to study and approach events and 
issues in various parts of the globe and more 
particularly the Indo-Pak conflicts not in their own 
merits but mechanically in terms of the logic of cold 
war. 
Moreover India perceives itself as a potential 
major power in its own right and has persistently 
attempted against great odds, to keep future options 
open for the achievement of the aspirations. This has 
earned for it the fury of the US global strategy. Hence 
Indo-American relations can be properly understood only 
iil 
in the context of the dynamic interaction between the 
two fundamentally opposed driving forces, the Indian 
aspiration to assume an unduly important role in 
international politics and the US aim to thwart its 
objects in the pursuit of its own security interests. 
Against this background the present study which 
is divided in four chapter, attempt to analyse the Indo-
American relations for a period of 1971-1980. 
In the first chapter attempt is made to 
evaluate the major goals of India's foreign policy for 
the protection of its freedom in foreign affairs and 
the security of the country. It also takes an account 
of the major irritants which prevented the two countries 
from establishing friendly relations. 
The Second chapter deals with the relations 
between the two countries during Mrs. Indira Gandhi's 
period. During this period the Indo-American relations 
reached to its lowest ebb on account of Bangladesh 
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crisis. During the Bangladesh crisis the United States 
sent its seventh fleet into the bay of Bengal which 
posed a grave threat to India's security. In this 
chapter efforts has also been made to evaluate the 
impact of Bangladesh crisis on the Indo-American 
relations. 
The Third Chapter deals with Indo-American 
relations during the Janata regime. The installation of 
Janata Government in India and Democrat's in Washington 
significantly changed the course of Indo-American 
relationship. Both Morarji Desai and Jimmy Carter tried 
to establish a rapport by personal correspondence. There 
was exchange of visits by the leaders of the two 
countries to repair the already damaged Indo-US 
relations. 
In the fourth chapter attempt is made to 
analyse the shift which had occurred in Indo-Tlmerican 
relations with the change of Government in India. This 
was the period when almost a new cold war had started 
between the two super powers after the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan crisis 
brought the cold war at India's door step because of 
the Pakistan's involvement in the crisis. The supply of 
weapons to Pakistan by USA posed a grave threat to 
India security because of US support to Pakistan on 
Kashmir issue. 
In the preparation of this dissertation I have 
largely relied on official documents. Attempt is made to 
utilize all the existence material on the topic, such 
as books, articles and newspapers reports and comments. 
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ination in the completion of this work . Verily He is 
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This chapter is primarily concerned with the 
Indo-American relations in a historical perspective to 
stress the point that from the very beginning, the 
policies of the two largest democracies of the world 
have often clashed over a number of issues of 
international and regional significance. The starting 
point for this purpose is 1947, the year India achieved 
independence. For, prior to independence, Indo-US 
interactions were extremely limited while India was 
under the British colonial rule until August 1947 and 
therefore, could not pursue an independent foreign 
policy vis-a-vis the United States. The US interest in 
India's freedom movement always remained limited and 
peripheral conditioned by British refusal to be 
pressurized by Roosevelt to grant independence to India. 
After the emergence as an independent State in 
1947 the most pressing need of the hour, in the 
perception of the nationalist leadership of India, was 
to protect the hard-won freedom and retain autonomy of 
decision in foreign relations. The stupendous task of 
nation building could not be fulfilled unless there was 
a peaceful environment for that. Also, due to its sheer 
size and history, India had an urge to play a major 
role in world affairs. 
Jawaharlal Nehur, who had been the chief 
spokesman of the Congress on international affairs 
during the freedom movement, also became the main 
architect of independent India's foreign policy. Non-
alignment, as conceived by him became the corner stone 
of India's conduct in foreign affairs. The policy of 
non-alignment was in keeping with Nehru's earlier 
thinking. As early as 1946, he had declared: 
We propose, as far as possible to 
keep away from the power politics of 
Groups, aligned against one another 
which have led in the past to world 
wars and which may again lead to 
disasters on even vaster scale. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: 
Selected Speeches. September 1949-April 1961. 
The Publications Division, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Government of 
India, New Delhi, 1961; p.80. 
In his view, non-alignment was "a policy 
inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the 
past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental 
out look of India, inherent in the conditioning of the 
Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent 
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in the circumstances of today". 
Thus the policy of non-alignment was deeply 
rooted in India's experiences during its struggle for 
freedom and the cold war which veritably divided the 
world into two hostile power blocs. A major security 
challange to India came from the politics of the cold 
war. The cold war with its blocs politics threatened to 
take away both India's independence and autonomy of 
decision in foreign relations. 
Thus India's policy of non-alingment became 
contradictory to the chief US foreign policy objectives 
viz., the containment of the Soviet communist bloc 
through a system of military alliances. When China also 
went 'Red' in 1949 the US, even more seriously 
2. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. 23, December 1958, Col 
3961, Government of India, New Delhi. 
confronted with the challange of conrmunism, especially 
in Asia. 
Apart from non-alignment, India accorded high 
priority to the issue of anti-colonialism. After two 
centuries of European domination, it was natural for 
India to pursue a strong anti-colonialist policy. Nehru 
observed that "the crisis of the time in Asia is 
colonialism vs anti-colonialism" .-^  Obviously for India, 
the colonial evil seemed to be a greater threat than 
communism as perceived by the US. This difference in 
assessment made it difficult for Indians and Americans 
to arrive at a common position on international issues. 
The US could not appreciate as to why India failed to 
recognized that colonialism was on decline and that 
communism was the real threat to the newly won 
independence of Asian nations.'* Thus, 
Asia's resurgence symbolized more than just freedom for 
the former colonies. It was the beginning of a new epoch 
W.J. Barnds, India. Pakistan and the Great 
Powers, London, 1972, p. 59. 
Ibid. 
in world history in which the Asian nations would again 
count for some thing.^ 
Related to the issues of anti-colonialism and 
Asian solidarity was India's friendly overtures to 
China. To Nehru's mind, China with its enormous 
potential strength had come to occupy the position of 
the great power in the world.° Hence, his policy of 
cultivating friendly relations with China had an 
inherent security rational, ,apart from the latter's role 
in the resurgence of Asia. India, much to the annoyance 
of the US, extended its recognition to communist China. 
Not only this but it also supported for its admission to 
the United Nations. Thus, while Nheru thought that the 
emergence of China as a unified country would change 
the balance of power in Asia, the united states, 
leaders on the other hand saw in China another sinister 
embodiment of international communism threatening the 
capitalist world order. 
5. Ibid. 
6. For details, See Nehru, n.l, pp. 304-305. 
When Nehru visited the United States for the 
first time in October 1949 on "a voyage of discovery""^ 
the secretary of State, Dean Acheson found him "one of 
the most difficult man to deal with". ^  On the crucial 
question of containing the two communist powers the 
Soviet Union and China - the Indian and American views 
remained poles apart during Nehru's visit. India also 
questioned the utility of the western - led military 
alliance to contain communism in the new states of Asia 
where political senstiment was consolidating around 
nationalism. In India, the application of American 
military power outside Europe to create regional 
balances against the expansion of communism was seen 
as aggravating the very conditions which the US sought 
to prevent. 
By the early 50s itself then, the basic 
divergence in the strategic perspective had become clear 
7. Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India: 
The Dimensions of influence. New York, 1984, p, 
22. 
8. T.V. Kunhikrishnan, The Unfriendly Friends; 
India and America.Indians Book Company, New 
Delhi, 1974, p. 125. 
as exemplified by differing Indian and US views on the 
cold war, China and the issue of ant i-colonial ism. The 
Korean crisis that erupted in 1950 as a spill over the 
cold war found India and the US taking quite different 
stands, when civil war broke out in Korea, the US 
wanted to contain North Korea which, according to 
Washinton, represented international communism. India 
opposed this view, and when the US wanted a UN force to 
fight against North Korea, India voted only for a UN 
presence m P:orea. The UN force, composed largely of 
the Americans under Geneal Macarthur's command crossed 
the 38th parallel despite India's warning that this 
would bring China into the fray. In January 1951, India 
was the only non-communist state that voted against a 
US sponsored resolution in the United Nations General 
Assembly, condemning the Chinese invasion of Korea. 
When peace talks on Korea started in July 1951, 
the two warning sides remained disagree on the issue 
of exchange of POWs which again threatened to start 
fresh hostilities. India took a mediating role and 
9. Ibid, p. 121. 
prepared a plan to resolve the dead-lock. Although the 
US finally accepted the Indian plan and Dean Acheson, 
the US Secretary of State, praised Krishna Menon for 
his dedication to peace, Washington did not forget for 
a long-time the firm stand India took against the 
United states on Korea. The US failure in Korea made 
Washington more suspecious not only of communist regimes 
but also of India.-^ ^ • 
The security links forged between the US and 
Pakistan were based on logic of mutual reciprocity. The 
US was frantically looking for an ally in the region to 
contain the menance of communism interestingly, it was 
India and not Pakistan which was first favoured as a 
surrogate and subordinate ally of the US. But Indian, 
aspiring for an independenct role in international 
politics, did not agree to the US strategic 
calculations. On the other hand, Pakistan for its own 
reasons was willing to ally itself with the US in the 
latter's grand design against communism. A militarily 
weaker Pakistan which by itself could never 
10. Ibid. 
hope to achieve parity with India in terms of military-
power, began to look to external sources for 
strengthening itself militarily vis-a-vis India. The US 
was the most promising external source for this 
purpose. Pakistan was willing to act a bulwark against 
communism in the region, in return for US arms and 
political support, chiefly on the Kashmir issue. The US 
could not hope to get a better deal.-^  
2 
The US, under the Eisenhower Administration, 
decided to supply arms to Pakistan in early 1954 even 
though the US Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles had 
protested against this arguing that "American arms 
supplied to Pakistan could be used against India and 
would tend to foster greater instability in the Middle 
East and South Asia.-^^ 
This heralded an era of close US-Pak military 
links which was manifested in three major security 
agreements between them in both bilateral and 
11. See M.S. Venkataramani, The American role in 
Pakistan : 1947-58, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 80-88. 
12. Rajvir Singh, US-Pakistan-India; 
Strategic Relations. Allahabad, 1985, p.30 
multilateral arrangements. In May 1954, the US and 
Pakistan signed the 'Mutual Defence Agreement Pact' 
Whereby the former undertook to provide arms to Pakistan 
for its defence. Later the same year, Pakistan also 
joined SEATO, a multilateral security pact sponsored by 
US, primarily directed against China. A year later 1955, 
Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact which afterwards came 
to be known as CENTO. Subsequently, the US arms began to 
be "pumped" generously to this "most allied ally". 
This evoked strong opposition from India. Nehru 
reacted thus: 
"In effect Pakistan becames practically 
a colony of the US . . . The US imagine 
that by this policy, they have 
completely out flanked India's so-
called neutralism and will thus bring 
India to her knees. Whatever the future 
may hold, this is not going to happend. 
The first result of all this will be an 
extreme dislike of the US in India"'^ -^  
13. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. Bombay, 
1976, Vol. 2, p. 185. 
India could not fail to discern a sinister 
design in the US habnobbing with Pakistan, whose 
betenoire remained India and not the Soviet Union. 
Clearly, the Pakistani Security link with the United 
States was directed against India and not either China 
or the Soviet Union. General Ayub Khan, who was 
instrumental in Pakistan's entry into CENTO, himself 
made this point clear when he said "the cr\ax of the 
problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude 
of the hostility towards US. We had to look for allies 
to securre our position."^^ He also observed that 
"after all, India is five times the size of the 
Pakistani forces. In actual fact, the military aid to 
Pakistan was designed to provide merely a deterrent 
force".^^ 
Obviously, by forging close defence links with 
the US, Pakistan was seeking to change the regional 
balance of power in a way favourable to itself 
14. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters. London, 1967, 
p. 154. 
15. Ibid, p. 130 
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particularly in terms of acquiring parity with India and 
assuming a strong posture on the Kashmir issue. Not 
that the US was not aware of the implications of its 
arms supplies to Pakistan for India. The US knew 
Pakistan's limitations in serving as a bulwark against 
the Soviet Union. Still, it hoped to get some base 
facilities in Pakistan which was so close to Soviet 
Union geographically. Secondly, it deliberately wanted 
to "build-down" India by "building-up " Pakistan 
militarily. 
» The US-Pak militarily ties were further 
reinforced when in March 1959, they signed another 
Bilateral Agreement of co-operation which was in effect, 
a second Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. This 
contained a pledge that in the event of aggression 
against Pakistan, the US would "take appropriate action, 
including the use of armed force".^^ 
This agreement which was basically a security 
pact but for the name only added to Indian fear of the 
16. A.Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign 
Policy and Relations. South Asian Publishers, 
New Delhi, 1985, pp. 36-37. 
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dangers of bringing extra-regional powers into the sub-
continent. In other words, for India, this security 
alliance meant bringing of the cold war to South Asia. 
Hence the only way India could meet the threat emerging 
from a heavily armed Pakistan was to build up its own 
defence. 
Thus in the 1950s, apart from sharp 
perceptional differences over the cold war and East-West 
relations which marred the prospects of good Indo-US 
relations, the US military aid to Pakistan became 
another stumbling block. According to two American 
experts on South Asia, "it was the initiation of a 
formal military assistance programme to Pakistan that 
was to shape American role in the sub-continent for 
T 7 
almost twenty years." 
On the sensitive issue of Kashmir, India found 
the US stance hostile to it right since the very 
beginning. No wonder then, the issue of Kashmirs vital 
to India's security only widened the cleavage in the 
Indo-US relations. 
17. Stephen P. Cohen and Richard L. Park, India 
Emergent Powers, New York, 1978, p. 55. 
13 
It may be recalled that when India referred the 
question of Kashmir to the UN security council, the US 
adopted an unfriendly attitude towards India and wanted 
the UN security council not to sit in judgement over 
Pakistan aggression but to decide on the terms of a 
plebiscite to determine whether the state should be a 
part of India or Pakistan. ^ ° The US never condemned 
Pakistan aggression. Rather, it always pressurized India 
at the United Nations to hold the plebiscite quickly, 
even, before the aggression was vacated by Pakistan. 
Obviously, India felt offended by the US 
insistence on the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. 
India had valid reasons to suspect that the United 
States support to Pakistan was tied up with the 
American hope of acquiring military bases in the 
Pakistan's occupied Kashmir adjoining the Soviet Union 
and Chxna. Much worse, the US was inciting Sheikh 
Abdullah to aim at an independent Kashmir. During his 
visit to Kashmir in May 1953, Adlai Stevenson, the US 
18. Kunhikrishnan, n.8. p. 115. 
19. Ibid.. p.166. 
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Senator, was reported to have urged Sheikh Abdullah to 
repudiate Kashmir's accession to India and declare 
Kashmir independent. ^ Timely intervention by New Delhi 
led to Abdullah's arrest and to the failing of US 
Abdullah plan.21 
The US-Pak Security link in 1954 made it 
impossible for India to withdraw troops from Kashmir 
and hold a plebiscite. Ever since then, the US has been 
favouring Pakisthan on Kashmir at the multilateral 
forums. It was because of the Soviet support to Indian 
stand on Kashmir that India avoided being pressurized 
by the US to make serious compromises on Kashmir. In the 
50s and 60s, Kashmir remained a major irritant in Indo-
US relations. 
Throughout the 1960s Indo-US relations were 
marked by differing perspectives on issues of strategic 
importance. Although there were occasions when Indo-US 
20. Ibid, p. 117. 
21. Cited in V.D. Chopra, Pentagon Shadow over 
India. New Delhi, 1985, p. 69. 
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relations warmed up, on the whole differences continued 
to persist. When Indian troops entered Goa and liberated 
it from the Portuguese rule in December 1961, the US 
criticized its action. President Kennedy called it as 
"India's invasion of Goa" and deplored it as " most 
unfortunate". When the UN Security council discussed 
the issue of Goa, the US mounted scathing criticism 
of India for using force and violating the UN Charter. 
This came as a rude shock to India and created 
bitterness in Indo-US relations. 
The Sino-Indian border tensions were brewing 
since the mid 50s and they assumed very serious 
dimensions by 1959. Nehru's China policy came crumbling 
down when the Chinese launched a massive attack on 
India on 20 October 1962. India found itself ill-
prepared militarily to check the Chinese invasion in 
mountaineous region of NEFA and Ladakh. In the event, 
Nehru made an urgent appeal to Washington for military 
supplies to meet the Chineese threat. The Kennedy 
administration responded very promptly to Nehur's 
appeal. As two noted Indian analysts put it: "in a 
speedy response to the Indian military requirements, 
16 
the US provided small arms and equipment of the value of 
$5million" . ^^^ 
Although highly disillusioned with China, India 
was not willing to forge military relationship with the 
USA. However, as the Chinese troops kept on advancing 
menacingly, India was in urgent need of US arms and 
assisstance. India submitted a list of weapons to the US 
which included small arms, artillery, road building 
equipment, radars and transport planes. -^  In addition 
to arms, India also requested "for American fighting 
94 
air support" 
According to the then US Ambassodor, Chester 
Boweles, Kennedy instructed him to explore the 
"possibility of a long range military understanding 
which would prevent India from developing military 
relationship with communist states and strengthen our 
political military ties with the Government of India 
22. A.Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, n.l6, p.238. 
23. Ibid.. p. 239. 
24. Cited in Ibid. 
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against Chinese communist".^^ But even this gesture of 
US military cooperation with Idnia was not offered 
without putting indirect pressures and preconditions. 
In US estimation, "the supply of weapons could be used 
as a lever to achieve Indian concessions on Kashmir".^^ 
In fact the US did insist on India to resume 
negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir issue. And India 
had to hold as many as six rounds of talks in this 
regard through they proved abortive eventually. 
Thus, the Idnian optimism that the US could 
prove a reliable partner to meet the Chinese threat 
away very soon when the Jonhson administration, which 
had succeeded the previous administration after 
Kennedy's assasination, attached unacceptable strings 
with an already curtailed offer of US arms. As India 
25. Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for 
Power: Indira Gandhi Foreign Policy: 1966-82. 
Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1984, p. 77. 
26. Michael Brecher, "Non-Alignment under stress: 
The West and the India-China Border war". 
Pacific Affairs. Vol. 52 No. 4, winter 1979-
80, p. 622. 
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could not accept these stringent conditions for US arms 
supply, a large part of the conceived arms deal did not 
materialize. Also responsible for this failure was 
Pakistan's strong protest to the US against arms supply-
to India towards which the Johnson administration showed 
a great deal of sensitivity. India naturally felt 
greatly disillusioned with what it perceived as US 
'double standards' in dealing with India and Pakistan. 
While India was refused its legitimate demands for US 
arms suitable for mountaineous terain against China, 
Pakistan continued to be given US weapons, mainly 
suitable for use against the plane along the Indo-Pak 
border. The US attitude towards India in the post 1962 
war period only demonstrated the limitations of 
accommodation of US interests in the region. 
•""^ Thus, the 1962 war presented a good opportunity 
for a long term security relationship between India and 
US. The US did have good intensions to help India. It 
had a stake in the survival of Indian democracy. China 
crushing victory on India would have meant its 
unchallenged dominance in the region which was not 
acceptable to the US whose relations with China were 
19 
quite tense over the issues of South - East Asia and 
Indo-China. 
It was thus that the opportunity to build-up 
stronger relations slipped by, without exploited to the 
fullest extent. There were several reasons for this. 
First, the US started pressurising India to hold talks 
with Pakistan on Kashmir.^^ Secondly, when India 
requested Washington for long-range defence support 
including supply of arms and assistance for creating an 
arms industry, the request was rejected by USA. The 
Indian request, originally estimated at billions of 
dolldars, was whittled down to only $500 million by the 
US and of this also only $82 million worth of radar and 
communications equipment were delivered before the arms 
embargo imposed by the Johnson administration on both 
India and Pakistan iji 1965. 
In September 1965, the Second Indo-Pakistani war 
brokeout. Once again Pakistan was the aggressor. In 
fact, it was the massive stockpile of US weapons in 
27. Mansingh, n. 25, p. 77. 
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Pakistan that had emboldened it to attack India and 
settle the problem of Kashmir militarily. According to 
Stephen P. Choen, "the transfer of US arms to Pakistan 
undertaken in mid-1950s had became a Pakistani asset 
and an Indian problem by 1965".^^ Thus India's early 
fears that the US arms would ultimately be used against 
her came true. The US weapons, most notably the M-47 
and M-46 Patton Tanks, F-86 Sabre aircraft, F-104 super 
Sonic fighters and B-57 light attack jet bombers were 
all used against India during this war.''^  
Eisehower's Written assurance to Nehru that the 
US would not permit Pakistan to use American equipment 
against India were worthless. Although Pakistan had 
violated the US Policy by using the US supplied military 
equipment, the Johnson administration was unwilling to 
28. Stephen P.Cohen, "South Asia and US military 
Policy" In S.L. Rudolph and S.H. Rudolph (eds.), 
The Recrional Imperative: US Foreign Policy 
towards South Asian States. New Delhi, 1980, p. 
104. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Mansingh, n.25, p. 29. 
21 
choose between the two rivals. ^  
Though the US adopted a neutral posture in the 
1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it only exposed its negative 
attitude towards India. For America, South Asia had 
become an era of low priority and its focus of attention 
has shifted towards Vietnam. As such, it was ready to 
play a low key role in the subcontinental affairs and 
allow the Soviet to act as mediators between India and 
Pakistan. The real fact, however, was that the US wanted 
the Soviet Union to shoulder the responsibility of 
countervailing the increasing influence of China in 
South Asia due to the growing Sino-Pakistani Politico-
military collaboration. 
Amidst strong Indian protests, the US cut off 
its military assistance to both India and Pakistan. But 
this was greatly resented by India. The Indian 
Government was angered that the US without taking into 
account which country was wrong, equated the aggressor 
31. Francine R Frankel, "Play the India card". 
Foreign Policy. Washington, No. 62-65, Spring 
1986, p. 154. 
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and the aggressed party by cutting off aid to India and 
•JO 
Pakistan simulataneously. 
In the late 60s the super power sponsored NPT 
which finally came into effect in 1970. The treaty led 
to serious differences between India and US in regard to 
global nuclear proliferation under article I of the 
NPT, nuclear weapon states were prohibited from 
transfering nuclear arms or devices to any recipient and 
from helping non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in the 
production or aquisition of such weapons. Article II 
obligate upon non-nuclear weapon states to undertake 
not receive nuclear arms or control over them from any 
state and not to produce or obtain such weapons or to 
seek help in their production. Article III, the most 
restrictive clause made it binding for each NNWS 
signatory to the treaty, to observe the safeguards of 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over all 
their nuclear installations. 
India, being sceptical of certain things like, 
(i) the balance of obligations between nuclear and non-
32. A.Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, n^ 16, p. 242. 
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nuclear countries, (ii) the nature of the security 
assistances from the super powers to non nuclear 
countries, (iii) the prohibition of certain peaceful 
uses of nuclear technology and (iv) the inspection 
clause, refused to sign the NPT.^ -^  Besides, India was 
also convinced that the NPT could imped its nuclear 
progarrame for basic developmental purposes and would 
make it dependent for many years to come, in the nuclear 
weapon states for its nuclear technology.-^^ Thus, the 
NPT would go against India professed policy of self-
reliance in the nuclear field. 
Pointing to the provision of unequal application 
of the safeguard clause. India branded the NPT as " 
super power led international regime that discriminated 
against the nuclear have-nots".^^ It strongly objected 
to the absence of a balance of obligations between 
the nuclear "haves" and non-nuclear "have-nots". Under 
33. K.P. Chari, "India's Nuclear Policy", in icTp. 
Mishra (ed.), Janata's Foreign Policy. Vikas 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, p. 67. 
34. Palmer, n.7, p. 215. 
35. Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Options: Atomic 
Diplomacy and Decision Making. New York, 1976, 
p. 210. 
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the provision of the NPT the nuclear powers were under 
no obligations to either destroy or reduce their own 
nuclear stock piles. As such, the NPT did not seek to 
check the vertical proliferation of nucelar weapons. It 
only sought to check horizontal proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and there by to maintain a status quo 
in the global distribution of nuclear power. 
Therefore, India held the NPT to be highly 
discriminatory and refused out rightly to be a signatory 
to such a treaty. Besides, India was unwilling to 
commit itself to any future restraint by acceding to 
legally binding internatioinal obligations. As a 
result, the NPT became a major factor in souring Indo-
US relations in the late 60s and through 70s. It 
demonstrated on the one hand the US intensions to 
prevent India from acquiring nuclear weapons 
capability and thereby becoming a power to reckon with 
and India's persistance to assert its autonomy of action 
in the nuclear field on the other. 
The above record of the Indo-US relation between 
the year 1947 and 1970 makes it amply clear that India 
and the US could not come to an understanding on vital 
25 
strategic issues. This resulted in mutual distrust and 
suspicion on a number of occasions and issues. There 
always remained a lack of synchronisation of strategic 
perceptions between the two 'largest democracies' of 
the world. This in turn , was largely a function of the 
different aspirations of India and the US. India, a 
regional power with great potential of resources and 
strength, aspired to play an independent role in the 
region and asserted its own autonomy in international 
politics. The US, on the other hand, framed its policies 
in a global context and in the process, ignored India's 
aspirations most of the time. Strained mutual relations 
became an inevitable out come. As a noted analyst put 
it astutely. Indo-US relations need to be examined in 
the context of the dynamic interaction between two 
fundamental but apposed driving forces; the persistent 
Indian aspiration to be a 'subject ' of international 
politics, while lacking capabilities, and the US aim to 
render other countries including India as 'objects ' 
in the pursuit of its own security interests.^° 
36. B.R. Nayar, "Treat India Seriously", Foreign 
Policy. Washington, Nos.32-35, Spring, 1975, p. 
138. 
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JndO'American delations During the 
Mrs. Jndira Qandhi 8ra 
After Indo-Pak war of 1965 India decided to 
strengthen its defence but there was a need of foreign 
assistance to make its defence forces uptodate. For 
this purpose, India first turned to the United States. 
However, the US showed its unwillingness towards India, 
because of the pleading of Pakistan, and its supporters 
in Pentogon, though it continued to provide military 
weapons to Pakistan. This was merely due to US embargo 
on the sale of arms to both India and Pakistan. The US 
arms embargo hit India harder as Pakistan had already 
received huge military supplies. 
The embargo did not continued for long. It was 
partially lifted within a short span of time to permit 
the sale of non-lethal weapons to Pakistan. India 
opposed this US step because this will generate tension 
between the two countries. India and Pakistan had signed 
a truce agreement at Taskant and the source of tension 
had defused temporarily. 
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The US continued arms supply to Pakistan till 
the end of 1970 which caused considerable tension in 
India. The Indian Government protested against this aid 
on the ground that this arms would disturb the peace 
and stability of the sub-continent, as aggression 
committed against India in the post by Pakistan were 
made possible by the US arms. 
In 1971 the Indo-US relations reached the 
lowest ebb. As T.N. Kaul put it, "So far as India is 
concerned the Nixon - Kissenger policy was exposed in 
its ugly nakedness during the Bangladesh crisis and 
the Indo-Pak conflict in 1971". Lack of geographical 
contiguity, ethinic differences, step-motherly treatment 
by West Pakistan, economic exploitation and the 
imposition of Urdu by West Pakistan on Begali speaking 
East Pakistan set the stage for tragic drama that 
1. Lok Sabha debates. Vol. 45, No. 1, 9 Novembers. 
1970,Col. 26-27, also see Indian and Foreign 
Review, Vol. 8, No.2, 1970, p. 7. 
2. T.N. Kaul, The Kissinger years: Indo-American 
Relations, 1980, p.22. 
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unfolded in the emergence of Bangladesh. The refusal 
of West Pakistani leaders and authorities to hand-over 
power to East Pakistan based Awami League party which 
had won the election with a conspicuous majority, 
resulted in the awakening and revolt in East Pakistan 
against West Pakistani discrimination. It was on 25 
March 1971 that the crisis entered a serious phase with 
•a 
the declaration of independence by Bangladesh.-^ 
Immediately, West Pakistan tried to crush the 
liberation movement brutally with its army and started 
a reign of terror slaughtering thousands of common 
people without any discrimination. 
India had been keenly watching the situation but 
did not interfere in the initial stages on the ground 
that it was an internal affairs of Pakistan. However, 
the inhuman atrocities of Pakistani soldiers that took 
innumerable innocent lives became a question of human 
Ved Vathi Chathushreni, Indo-US Relations. New 
Delhi, 1980, p. 250. 
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rights to which India could not remain indifferent. The 
mass exodus of refugees into India's north-eastern 
region placing an unbearable social and economic burden 
in a sensitive area brought the India factor to the 
fore. Not only was the Bangladesh government-in-exite 
allowed to function on Indian territory but santuary 
was given to the members of the Mukti Bahini and 
political leaders fighting for the liberation of 
Bangladesh. 
Mrs. Gandhi expressed her concern and 
apprehension over the immense destruction in Bangladesh 
and moved a resolution which was unanimously adopted in 
the Lok Sabha, expressing sympathy and solidarily with 
the people of Bangladesh. India was not, however, 
interested to solve the problem through any military 
actions because such a course would carry with it the 
danger of escalation of an all out war with Pakistan 
involving Chinese intervention as well as military 
support by the US. That is why India stressed the need 
30 
for a political solution of the Bangladesh problems. 
But with the endless exodus of the refugees India became 
a direct party in the problem. Many members of the 
parliament including members from the opposition 
benches pleaded with the government to recognise 
Bangladesh as an independent country and to extend more 
support to the Mukti Bahini forces fighting for 
freedom.^ 
The US stand on this crisis was distinct and 
totally contrary to that of India's, Washington was 
slow to take up a public position on the merit of 
Pakistan's action in the East and the first US 
reaction was that Pakistan must be persuaded to accept 
humanitarian support, as for as possible through multi-
lateral international agencies despite her insistence on 
4. Ibid.. n.3, p. 253. 
5. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. 11, No.l, May 24, 1971 
Cols. 130-38 & Vol. 11, No. 2, May 25, 1971. 
Cols. 206, 21, 29, 30-35. 
31 
her exlusive jurisdictioin in her own domestic affairs. 
It was clear that President Nixon was most anxious to 
avoid any development such as a war in the sub-
continent which might jeopardise his newly begun China 
diplomacy.^ The US storve its best to end the crisis 
through a peaceful settlement which would be favourable 
to Pakistan. It was thus that even the west Pakistani 
atrocities escalated inEast Bengal, the US refrained 
from condemning Pakistan, and endorsed the veiw that the 
crisis was an internal matter of Pakistan. The problem 
was treated as a security issue or a threat posed by 
India to an American ally, a strange contention which 
was testified by the Pentagon papers."^ The united states 
administration took ostensible position that the East 
Bengal revolt was a secessionist movement and there fore 
Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India. 
Pakistan, Bangladesh. London, 1975, pp. 42-43. 
R.V.R Chandra Shaker Rao, "Searching for a 
Matured Relationship, India and America", Round 
Table. (London), No. 263 July 1976, p. 254 
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justified General Yahya Khan's attempt to suppress it. 
Within these parameters, the US was willing to extend 
sympathy and material support for the relief of refugees 
and bring about a dialogue between India and Pakistan to 
defuse the tension and strive for a settlement. It, 
however, refused to consider India's plea for a 
settlement in Bangladesh through the release of Muzib. 
Meanwhile the refugee influx was becoming a big broblem 
for the Indian economy. India vehemently protested 
against the US supplies of arms to Pakistan which it was 
using to crush the revolt. The then India's Foreign 
Minister, Swaran Singh, visited Washington. Although the 
US secretary of states Rogars, assured him that the US 
has already suspended all financial and military aid to 
Pakistan. This was belied soon after.^ Swaran Singh 
disclosed in the Indian parliament that senator chureh's 
statement of seven July 1971, had officially admitted 
8. V.D. Chopra, Pentagon Shadow over India, New 
Delhi, 1985, p. 127. 
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tha t 35 mi l l ion worth of mi l i t a ry equipment was actually-
sent to Pakis tan. 
In c o n t r a s t , the US government ac t ed with 
a l a c r i t y i n r e s p e c t of even the l i m i t e d q u a n t i t y of 
mi l i t a ry equipment that was to be sold to India, when on 
1 December, they announced the c a n c e l l a t i o n of a l l 
q 
ammunition list of licenses for India. The US was 
aware of the concenstration of Pakistan armies on the 
Indian borders but continued to support Pakistan. 
Kissinger's visit to India in July, 1971, did 
not witness any improvement either in the Indo-US 
relations or any softening of the US stand on the 
Bangaladesh crisis.-^^ After the kisinger's secret visit 
to Beijing Pak-China-US friendship was growing 
considerably. In the meantime, in an effort to counter 
this triangular threat to India, India signed the Indo-
9. Chathushreni, n.3 p. 261. 
10. Ibid.. p. 263 
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Soviet treaty of 1971 which widened the gulf of 
misunderstanding between India and US. The articles 
VIII, IX and X of the treaty were abjectionable to the 
US because these were seen as having the substance of a 
defence agreement. . 
As the Bangladesh crisis started escalating, 
India tried to focus international attention on the 
issue. Mrs. Gandhi Visited several countries for this 
purpose. Early in November 1971, Mrs. Gandhi visited 
Washington to seek the US support, on the plight of the 
refugees who had come to India from East Pakistan to 
reach a settlement with East Pakistan.-^^ Mrs. Gandhi 
met a highly responsive public opinion but an equally 
unresponsive White House. •'•^  Though the American tilt 
11. Bimal Prasad, "The superpower and the sub-
continent", International studies. New Delhi, 
Vol, 13, No. 4, October 1974, pp. 737-738. 
12. W. Norman Brown, The United States and India. 
Pakistan, Bangaladesh, Cambridge, 1974, p. 223. 
13. V. P. Dutt, India's foregin Policy. Vikas 
Pulishing House, New Delhi, 1984, p. 82. 
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was obvious, Kissinger tried to give a different version 
by stating that it was an "incorrect" assesment in his 
back ground briefings on 7 December 1971.-'-'* But US tilts 
towards Pakistan became clear an evident Kissinger's own 
statement that he was getting help from the President 
for not tilting enough towards Pakistan, which has been 
subsequently revealed by Anderson.-^^ The US 
administration complained that India escalated the war 
by taking a military action on 22 November, when there 
were light skirmishes between the troops of two 
countries on Bengal border. ° Another allegation was 
that, India had received an assurance from the Soviet 
Union that it would intervene in the event of US or 
14. Satish Kumar, "US Policy towards India and 
Pakistan", India Quarterly, New Delhi, vol.31, 
No.l, January - March 1975, p. 3. 
15. V.P. Dutt, n. 13, p. 82 and Satish Kumar, n. 18, 
p. 36. 
16. See Vinod Gupta, Andersan Papers • A study of 
Nixon's Black Mail of India. Delhi, 1972, p. 51. 
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17 Chinese military involvement m the sub-continent. 
Meanwhile since Pakistan was deploying troops, India 
also did the same for self-defence on her side of the 
borders. There fore, when US proposed for the withdrawal 
of troops on both sides, India turned down the proposal 
on the plea that Pakistan military bases were close to 
the border while India's were located far behind. •'•° With 
these skirmishes, army deployments and Pakistan's 
continued atrocities in East Bangal, the stage was set 
for another Indo-Pak War. 
Nixon's war with India had already started a 
week before the war brokeout in the Indian sub-
continent. The US rushed plane loads of arms to Pakistan 
on 2 9 November 1971 to provoke India much before the war 
brokeout between these two countries on 3 December 
17. S. R. Sharma, Bangladesh Crisis and India's 
Foreign Policy. Young Asia Publication, New 
Delhi, 1978, p. 220. 
18. Ibid.. p. 221. 
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1971. •'•^  The US suspanded arms supplies to India with 
immediate effect and also cancelled other commitments 
made earlier. The then India's Foreign Minister, Sawran 
Singh, confirmed this in the Lok Sabha in a statment. He 
disclosed that India had been informed by the US 
government that in view of what they regarded as "the 
deteriorating situation in South Asia and continued 
military engagements between India and Pakistan armed 
forces", they had decided on December 1, 1971 to suspend 
the issueance of all further ammunitions lists licences 
for India, not to issue any new licences or renew 
existing ones; and co cancel several licences, the total 
value of which, according to their estimate was 
approximately $2 million.^° When the war brokeout, the 
American stand in favour of Pakistan become clear. In 
fact, even before that, India learnt form its mission in 
19. Gupta, n. 16 p. 19. 
20. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. IX, No. 15, 6 December, 
1971, Cols. 196-97, Government of India, New 
Delhi. 
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Washington that Nixon was seriously considering invoking 
the 1954 Mutual Security Pact between the US and 
Pakistan and coming to the latter's rescue. It was 
against this background that Mrs. Gandhi in a speach in 
Delhi obliquely warned the US, "I hear that some 
countries are trying to threaten us and saying that they 
have some treaties and agreements with Pakistan. I did 
not know about this earlier because what 
ever agreement is there as far as I know, had been 
forged to form a pact against communism. It was not a 
pact to fight democracy. It was not against the voice of 
justice. It was not mean to crush the poor. But if it 
was so, then they told a big lie to the world".^ -^  
Notwithstanding India's dismay and shock, the US 
described India as an aggressor in the war and condemned 
Indian acts.^^ On 4 December Nixon stated publicly that 
21. V. D. Chopra, n. 8, p. 128 and see also M. L. 
Gujral, U£ Global Involvement: A study of 
American Expansion. 1975, p.315. 
22. Chathushreni, n. 3, p. 270 
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India would have to bear the major responsibilities for 
hostilities that had ensued. ^ ^ The US made staunch 
opposition to India and did all that it could do for 
Pakistan at the United Nations. On 5 December, the US 
introduced a resolution in the security council calling 
for immediate cessation of hostitities and withdrawal of 
armed personnel of India and Pakistan present on the 
territory of each others to their own sides of border. 
This aimed at bringing the war which was already going 
bad for Pakistan to a hurried close. The resolution 
was vetoed by the former Soviet Union. In the meantime 
Nixon abruptly terminated the whole US aid to India. 
India did not however, succumb to the US pressures. In a 
swift move, it recognized Bangaladesh on 6 December.^^ 
23. T. V. Kunhikrishnan, The Unfriendly Friends. 
India and America,Indian Book Company, New 
Delhi, 1974, p.17. 
24. Chathushreni, n. 3, p. 271. 
25. Rahmathullah, Indo-American Politics: 1970-78. 
Surjeet Publications, Delhi, 1980, p. 44. 
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On 6 Decen±»er, the US delegate to the UN, George Bush, 
s t a t e d in the s e c u r i t y counc i l t h a t I n d i a was an 
26 
aggressor and its aggresson was abviously clear. 
With the Soviet veto of the security council 
resolution, the US introduced a resolution in the 
General Assembly on 7 Deceinber, calling for cease-fire 
and withdrawal of forces. Though the resolution was 
approved, India refused to take heed since its 
compliance was not an obligation. 
Meanwhile, the US continued its arms supplies to 
Pakistan. Though formally it had stopped arms to 
Pakistan, it sent them through Jordon, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya and Turkey.'^° India reacted very sharply to this 
American military aid to Pakistan especially during war 
26. Chathushreni, n. 3, p. 271 
27. Brown, n. 12, p. 225. 
28. Sharma, n. 17, pp. 234-35. 
41 
time. The US did not take any heed but Nixon instead 
appealed to the security council on 12 December to take 
emergency action to halt the fighting and asserted that 
"East Pakistan is virtually occupied by Indian 
troops".^^ A White House statement reiterated that the 
US considered, the thrust of Indian troops in Bangladesh 
as "an attack on the very existence of a member state of 
the United Nations". Pakistan accepted the resolution 
but India rejected it and therefore, the US took the 
issue back to the security council.^ The US sponsored 
resolution v?as once again vetoed by the Soviet Union. 
Mrs. Gandhi reacted sharply and expressed strong 
resentment against the American attitude towards India. 
As the Indian troops and Mukti Bahini gained successes 
in drilling away Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, both US 
and China put renewed pressure on India to accept a 
cease-fire.-^ In a bid to put pressure on India, 
29. Asian Recorder, January 15-21, 1972, p. 10573. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Rahamathullah, n. 25, p. 49. 
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Washington reportedly requested Mascow to infonn New 
Delhi that it was under obligation to assist Islamabad 
•so 
to counter external aggression. 
When Pakistan was on its way to the inevitable 
defeat, the US took a drastic step to save it and 
"interfered", in the war in the sub-continent almost 
directly by ordering its Naval Task Force of seventh 
fleet led by world's biggest aircraft carrier 
'Enterprise' into the Bay of Bangal on 13 December 1971, 
which posed a direct threat to Indian security. 
Although US alleged that this act was to save 
the American nationals and evacuate them from East 
Bengal, but its intentions were clear. There was a 
subtle pressure on India to divert both ships and planes 
to shadow the US Task Force, to divert the Indian 
aircraft carrier 'Vikrant' from its military mission and 
to force India to keep its aircraft carrier on advance 
32. Krishnan, n. 23, p. 20 
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alert, thus reducing their effectiveness against 
Pakistani troops.-^ -^  It was also widely believed that the 
US motive was to establish a beach head for landing the 
marines on the Bangladesh coast. The Indian Ambassador 
to the US, L. K. Jha made this allegation publicly in 
Washington. But the state department denied it. But the 
clarification was more confusing than denial.^ But 
fortunately for India, the US threat was averted some 
what by the Russian warships that trial close behind.^^ 
More over, before the enterprise could get into action, 
the West Pakistani forces had surrendered in Bangladesh. 
The reaction in India from all sections, of the people 
was, however most bitter processions, demonstrations, 
slogans, news reports and resolutions against the 
sailing of the Task Force were recorded against the US 
33. Chopra, n. 8, p. 130. 
34. Gupta, n. 16, p. 123. 
35. Chathushreni, n. 3, p. 274. 
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military etnperialistn in Asia. ° In a letter to 
President Nixon, Mrs. Gandhi laid the responsibility on 
the US for its action, while justifying Indian stand on 
Bangladesh. She wrote; "with all the knowledge and deep 
understanding of human affairs, you, as President of the 
US and reflecting the will, the aspirations and the 
idealism of great American people, will atleast let me 
know where precisely we have gone wrong before your 
representatives or spokesman deal with us with such 
harshness of language. The Bangladesh crisis led a 
wide gulf in Indo-US relations bordering on an almost 
direct confrontation between the two countries. 
The 1971 war and the role played by the US put a 
great strain on Indo-US relations. It was indeed a 
severe setback for the US diplomacy in the region. After 
the 1971 war, India insisted on the recognition of the 
"newrealities" on the Indian sub-continent, meaning 
36. Ibid. 
37. Asian Recroder. January 12-18,1972,pp. 10574-75. 
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India's dominant position in South Asia, where as the 
Nixon administration still persisted in old assumption, 
insisting India should have balanced relationships with 
all major powers of the 1971 war."^ ^ 
The defeat of 1971 despite US support made 
Pakistan to cultivate friendly relation with other 
countries like the USSR and the Islamic world and to 
withraw from SEATO in 1972 which became useless for 
It. Although India's pre-emenence m the region was 
grudgingly recognised by the US. Pakistan nevertheless 
remained important for it because of its strategic 
location at the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Besides, 
it was felt that any further frangmentation of Pakistan 
could jeopardise the states of the sub-continent and 
more importantly else where in Asia, and in the Middle 
38. Baldev Raj Nayar, "Treat India seriously". 
Foreign Policy. Washington D.C., vol. 18, Spring 
1975, p. 15. 
39. Rashmi Jain, US-Pak Relations 1947-83. New 
Delhi, 1983, p. 37. 
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East. In addition to all these, Jack Anderson's 
disclosures had caused some embrassment in Washington 
which pointed out the lapses of US policy towards 
India >0 
The US policy towards South Asia was now 
directed towards promoting stability in the region and 
to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring predominant 
influence in the region at the expense of US interest. 
It, therefore, advocated the idea of regional 
reconciliation including the normalization of Indo-Pak 
relations because "encouragement of turmoil" would 
invite the "involvement of out side power".'^ -^  
Even though both India and US wanted to restore 
good relations as soon as possible several problems 
40. Kumar, n. 14, p . 37. 
41 . Jain, jQ^  39, p . 36, see a l s o Richard Nixon, US 
Fore ign P o l i c y f o r the 1 9 7 0 ' s . S tudy ing a 
durable peace, 3 May, 1973, Washington, ( n . d . ) , 
pp. 77-81. 
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remained as usual. The recognition of Bangladesh was a 
major issue. In his annual foreign policy message to the 
US congress on February 9, 1972, President Nixon said 
that the US was prepared for a new economic and 
political dialogue with India, "but of interest to US 
also will be the posture that South Asia's most powerful 
country now adopts towards its neighbours on the svib-
continent". The US government's annual foreign policy 
Sstatement issued in Washington on 7 March, 1972 repeated 
the charge that in last year's crisis in the sub-
continent, India had escalated the "use of force in the 
persuit of political ends, even at the risk, of full 
scale hostalities". -^  
On 3 May, Nixon welcomed the prospects of direct 
talks between the leader of India and Pakistan on the 
problem of South Asia. President Nixon said in a press 
42. Asian Recorder. April 1-7, 1972, p. 10699. 
43. Ibid. April 22-28, 1972, p. 10737. 
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conference on 10 February 1972 that the US would make 
efforts to develop a new relationship with the countries 
in the sub-continents. Agreeing that "we may have made 
mistakes", he said that "the US policy had purpose of 
avoiding war, of stopping the war once it began, and 
now doing everything we can to heal up the wounds of the 
1971 war". The US he said, "was trying to develop a new 
relationship that will be pro-India, pro-Pakistan, pro-
Bengal, and mostly pro-peace". ^  
On the part of India also, the willingness to restore 
good relations was obvious. Y. B. Chavan, said that 
India would not be averse signing a treaty of peace and 
friendship with the US.'^ ^ Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister 
for External Affairs also underlined India's readiness 
to do anything in its power to normalise its relations 
with the US, on the basis of recognition of the new 
44. V.P.Dutt, n. 13, p. 87. 
45. Ibid. 
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realities and on the basis of ec[uality, reciprocity and 
mutual respect.^^ With its recognition of Bangladesh on 
30 April, 1972, the US accepted the new realities on the 
sub-continent. President Nixon on 3 May 1973, stated in 
his foreign policy statement to the American congress : 
"India emerge from the 1971 crisis with 
new confidence, power and responsibility. 
The US respects India as major country, 
we are prepared to treat India in 
accordance with its new status and 
responsibilities, on the basis of 
reciprocity, because India is a major 
country, her action on the world stage 
necessarily affects our interest". 
46. Rajya Sabha Debates, vol. 82, Nos. 1-14, 1972, 
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Meanwhile, it was officially announced in 
Washington on 14 March 1973 that the US had resumed 
sales of non-lethal military equipment and spare parts 
to both India and Pakistan. The state department 
spokesman. Carles Eray, said the decision would make 
possible the sale of some 300 armoured personnel 
carriers with a value of $1.1 million in military spare 
parts, Parachutes and reconditioned air craft engines. 
The US, however made it clear that it had no intention 
to increase arms race in South Asia.'*° On March 15, 
Nixon defended his decision on relaxing curbs on arms 
shipment to Pakistan and said that this would not 
jeopardise peace in the area. He said that India's 
military superiority was so enormous that the 
possibility of Pakistan being threat to India was 
absurd.'* India reacted sharply to the new US move and 
reiterated that any resumption of American arms supply 
48. Asian Recorder. April 16-22, 1973, pp. 113-55. 
49. Ibid. 
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to Pakistan would be a negative factor in normalizing 
India's relations with both of them. The then India's 
External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh, said in the 
Rajya Sabha on March 14, that any attempt to rearm 
Pakistan would impede the implementation of Simla 
Agreement. He explained that "US military assistance to 
Pakistan had been a principal cause of strained 
relations between India and US as it encouraged anti-
India and militaristic policy to Pakistan".^^ Even the 
prestigious New York Times, criticised the American 
decision and called it "a step backward". " The Nixon 
Administration's decision to resume arms supply to South 
Asia principally to Pakistan marks a disturbing step. 
The danger lies in the potential psychological impact of 
renewal of American arms aid on international political 
developments in Pakistan and on delicate peace 
50. Foreign Affairs Records. Vol. 19, No.3, March 
1973, p. 132. 
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negotiations among Pakistan, India and Bangladesh . . . 
India's fear on this scope can not be entirely 
discarded in the light of the past record".^^ Nixon 
asserted on 3 May 1973 that the "US will not join any 
groupings to persue any policy directed against India". 
he added! " Our policy now, as before 1971, is to permit 
the export of non-lethal equipment previously supplied 
by the US. There is no change in our purpose. We are 
not participants in any arms race in the sub-
continent. "^^ . 
The US secretary of state. Henry Kissinger 
visited India in Oct, 1974. In the course of his visit, 
he stated that the US had given up the policy of 
building Pakistan in parity with India.^^ Kissinger's 
51. Mohammad Ayoob, India. Pakistan »and Bangladesh: 
Search for a New Relationship. New Delhi, 1975, 
pp. 56. 
52. Asian Recorder July, 9-15, 1973, pp. 87-88, 114 
53. Dutt, n.l3, p. 86. 
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visit was quite significant dispite its coolness in that 
it offered an opportunity for redefining the priorities 
for Indo-US relations .^ '^  
The emergence of China as fifth nuclear power in 
October 1964 constituted a significant threat to 
India's territorial integrity and Sovereignty. The 
strained relations between the two countries after the 
1962 aggression sparked off an acrimonious debate on 
defence policy in the parliament. While speaking on the 
capital outlay of the Department of Atomic Energy in 
the Lok Sabha on March 23, 1963, Bade, a member of the 
Jan Sangh Party strongly pleaded that India should 
manufacture atomic weapons in view of the threats posed 
by the Chinese on the borders. He contended that China 
possessed atomic weapons and it would be impossible 
for India to defend its sovereignty and territorial 
54. Arun Kumar Banerji, "Indo-US Relations: Problems 
and prospect", I.D.S.A. Journal.New Delhi,Vol.11 
No. 1, July-September, 1978, pp. 34-35. 
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integrity without the nuclear weapons.^^ 
India's emergence on the world nuclear scence is 
not a new phenomenon. It was in August 1972, itself Mrs. 
Gandhi had made her intensions obvious to carry out 
underground nuclear explosion for economic advancement 
of the country. The prospects of using atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes had been the aim of Jawaharlal Nehru 
and it was at his initiative that the Indian Atomic 
Energy Commission was established on 10, August 1948. 
Since then the AEC had been engaged in such programmes 
of peaceful nature. Idnia successfully exploded its 
first nuclear device on May 18, 1974 at about 08.05 A.M. 
at Pokhran in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan and thus 
emerged as the sixth nation to conduct such a test. 
The Government of India in its official 
announcement on explosion made it clear that it had " no 
55. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. XV, No. 26, 23 March 
1963, Cols. 5782-83, Government of India, New 
Delhi. 
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intension of nuclear weapons". While speaking to newsmen 
Mrs. Gandhi reiterated, the government's strong 
opposition to military uses of nuclear devices. She 
made it clear that India's" nuclear programme was 
designed for peaceful uses". The Indian Atomic Energy-
commission declared: " It was the part of the programme 
to keep India a breast of developments in under-ground 
explosions technology, particularly with reference to 
its use in the field of mining and earth moving 
operations" . The then India's Foreign Minister, Swaran 
Singh issued a statement on India's peaceful nuclear 
expolosion to the press on May 21, 1974. He 
categorically stated "We are happy to note that the 
peaceful nuclear experiment which took place on May 18, 
1974, represents a step forward on the road to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the welfare of our 
56. Balwant A. Desai (ed.), Atoms for Peace An 
Exposition of India's Nuclear Policy. An All 
India Congress Committee Publication, New Delhi, 
1975, p. 44. 
56 
people. I would like to congratulate our Scientists and 
others who have made it possible for this achievement by 
our country. This experiment is an important land-mark 
m the development of nucelar technology for peaceful 
and economic uses. we have no intension of developing 
IT 7 
nuclear weapons". 
However, Pakistan Prime minister Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto had held out a solemn pledge to his countrymen 
that he would never allow Pakistan to become a victim of 
India's nuclear black-mail and declared that Pakistan 
would never surrender its rights just only because of 
India's nuclear status and would not be deflected from 
its policies by this fateful development. He declared 
publicly that the people of Pakistan would be ready to 
offer any secrifices and even eat grass to ensure 
nuclear parity with India".^° 
57. J. P. Jain, Neclear India. Vol. II, Radiant 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1974, p. 339. 
58. Morning News. Kranchi, 20 May 1974. 
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Both the American officials and press were 
outraged by the Pokharan experiment and reacted rather 
angrily to the so-called nuclear proliferation. The US 
news media, the conservatives, the Liberals, the 
writers, the cartoonists and the commentators condemed 
India for its over ambitious and audacious move. They 
regarded it as" moral and political sins", "national 
hypocrisy" and " callous endangerment of humanity".^ 
The US administrations immediate response was, 
however, in a low key and Kissinger said that he did 
believe that it changed the balance of power in the 
region, although 'if India had asked our advice, we 
would probably have not recommended it.°^. 
The US officials were of the view that the 
development of India's nuclear capacity could disrupt 
Indo-US relations at a time when they are begining to 
improve. They felt that questions would be raised in 
59. B. Rahmathullah, n. 25, p. 69. 
60. Bulletin. Department of State, 24 June 1974. 
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congress about New Delhi economic aid. As one of the 
officials said: " I do not see how this is going to 
grow more rice, which is what the Indias need". •'• While 
speaking in the House of Representatives on May 22, 
1974, gross questioned Mrs. Gandhi's Government for 
having ventured such a costly project when 75% of 
Idnia's children are suffering from malnutrition. He 
pleaded with the congress to suspend the aid to Indian 
Government whose priority is to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. 
The US Ser.-ce decided by a voice vote to 
prohibit military aid or US grant sales of equipment to 
India except for military training purposes. °-^  The 
Senate Committee also suspended the US economic aid, 
61. Washington Post. 19, May 1974. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 93rd 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, Vol. XX, 
Washington D.C., P. 538. 
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military assistance and sales credit to India to a 
combined total of $50 million, $25.6 million less than 
proposed by the Administration.^'* The official of the US 
Atomic Energy Commission also suspended on September 7, 
1974 the delivery of enriched uranium fuel to India 
until New Delhi pledged not to use the atomic fuel in 
any nuclear explosion.°^ 
The US had promised to supply uranium fuel to 
the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant for over 30 years» in 
accordance with the agreement signed between the two 
countries. The atomic power plant near Bombay was built 
with the American assistance in 1963.^° The US officials 
had suspended the delivery of Uranium fuel to India in 
the wake of her nuclear blast in May, 1974. However, at 
64. Ibid, p. 542. 
65. Facts on File. Vol. 34, No. 1771, 19, October 
1974, P. 847. 
66. Anwar Yar Khan, "India: The Next Super Power" 
On Looker, Bombay, June 1974, p. 12. 
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a meeting in Washington between Indian Ambassador, 
Kewal Singh and the Secretary of State, Kissinger on 
August 2, 1974 it was decided in principles that the 
Indo-American Atomic Agreement of 1963 for the supply of 
enriched uranium-235 fuel elements for the Tarapur 
Atomic Power Plant should be specially modified. It was 
decided that the supply of uranium fuel would be only 
for power generation at this particular plant and not 
elsewhere for any other purpose without prior US 
approval. ^'^ 
The American nuclear experts and intelligentsia 
are well aware of the nuclear capability of India and 
it is also known to them that it is beyond the mean of 
India to attain nuclear parity with the US in the near 
future. Yet, the US Public and press got alarmed and 
lashed out at the triffle Indian blast. This is infact 
had an adverse impact on Indo-American relations. 
67. New York Times, 3 August 1974. 
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Washington's Department of State recognized the 
difference between a test of a nuclear device and a 
weapons programme which needs a major investment in 
communications, space and electronics technology. Dr. 
Kissinger felt that India's emergence as a peaceful 
nuclear power need not have any negative impact on the 
new relationship the US and India were interested in 
establishing, after the 1971 crisis. He was in 
disagreement with critics in the US Congress, the news 
media and some lower level officials in his own states 
Department, who perceived dangerous implications and 
who had reacted strongly.°° 
Mrs. Gandhi criticised the reaction in the US. 
Her administration appeared to have been unprepared for 
the adverse diplomatic reactions. Criticism had been 
expected from Washington, but no body in New Delhi 
appeared to have expected widespread doubts about 
India's intentions to restrict her nuclear technology to 
68. The Hindu. Madras, 17 July 1974. 
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peaceful purposes. Mrs. Gandhi attempted to appease 
foreign critics of India's test by offering to accept a 
complete ban on all nuclear tests on the conditions 
that all other states agreed to do so. ^  
In the first week of September 1974 the US 
halted uranium assistance to India. " Two weeks later, 
the US Atomic Energy Commission Sources said that the 
US would proceed with a scheduled shipment of nuclear 
fuel to India following a promise from New Delhi not to 
use It for nuclear explosion. 
One consequence of the test that did not at all 
please New Delhi was the termination of Washington's 
ten-year arms embargo on Pakistan, in early 1975 partly 
to discourage her from manufacturing a nuclear bomb. In 
69. The Guardian, Bombay, 17 June 1974. 
70. The Dawn. Kranchi, 18 July 1975. 
71. J. Maddox, "India: A Nuclear Quesiton", in The 
Times. 14 February 1975. 
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Islamabad, there was little doubt about the ultimately 
military purpose of the Indian test, two major signs 
being the conspicuous lack of any credible Indian 
schemes for civil exploitation and the economically 
irrational insistance on self-sufficiency in all aspects 
of nuclear technology. "^  
72. The Guardian. Bombay, 19 May 1975 
64 
Jndo-American KdatioHs Touring the 
Janata Qovernment 
Much of the discussion on Janata Party's foreign 
policy has been conducted within 'change and continuity' 
parameters. While some of the scholars have tended to 
look for the apparently new or novel in the party's 
conduct of foreign relations, many other concluded with 
satisfaction that there was a 'remarkable continuity' or 
only a difference of emphasis amounting to 'no decisive 
change'. That framework, however, has at best a limited 
utility, continuity of an earlier policy may not be a 
virtue in itself, nor change a thoughtless deviation or 
valuable novelty perse. It may be more worthwhile to 
look at the foreign policy initiatives and activities in 
the context of the perspectives or notions of the 
ruling party's leadership regarding the complex 
realities of international politics and their priorities 
both in the terms of professions and practice. It must 
also be kept in mind that a Government's foreign policy 
can not be adequately comprehended in isolation from its 
outlook on domestic environment and its priorities, 
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relating to social and economic development. It is 
therefore necessary to have a brief overview of the 
profile of the Janata Party and the frame of mind of 
the men whose judgements and decisions relating to 
foreign affairs of the subject of our review. 
Janata Party came to power in March 1977 and 
ruled India for 28 months. It was a product of the 
special circumstances created by Indira Gandhi's 
emergency regime. When the elections were suddenly 
announced and political leaders released from jails, 
leaders and groups of very conflicting political 
orientations came together on a one-point unity of 
purpose-defeat of Indira Gandhi's party. There was 
little else that was share by way of political 
objectives or approaches to the solution of formidable 
social and economic problems. In such a situations the 
urge to present a conspicuously novel alternative to the 
hated predecessor's programmes leads to high flown 
rhetoric of moralism. That provides an easy escape from 
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the tiresome obligation of serious consideration of 
alternative strategies in the face of the hard 
realities. The party's landslide victory mainly on a 
negative vote was taken, however, as a "peaceful 
revolution, unique in the history of the world", and as 
a " massive mandate for total revolution of JP's 
dreams. 
On external relations most of the Janata 
Party leaders, except a few socialists, had a known 
hostility towards former Soviet Russia, and felt a 
certain affinity with the US and the west in general. 
The Janasangh group was known also for its national 
chauvinism, hostility towards Pakistan and dislike for 
pro-Arab attitude of the congress. A few of them 
perhaps also thought that good relations be developed 
with China as a counter weight against Soviet influence 
in this region. They also favoured developing of atomic 
weapons. Morarji Desai, on the other hand, was known 
also for his rather hypocritical personal fads on moral 
uprightness in external affairs as strong as his fad 
Madhulimaye, "27 months of Failure", Mainstream. 
17th Annual Number 1979, p. 20. 
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for p roh ib i t ion or ur inetherapy. But none of the groups 
or l e a d e r s had a sense of h i s t o r y or any well 
considered view of the developing power alignments in 
the world. 
Gradua l ly t he J ana t a government developed a 
schizophrenic a t t i t u d e towards the US. I t continued, on 
the one hand, to s t r i v e for warm r e l a t i o n s and claimed 
to have achieved "a new rapport and understanding with 
USA", "^  and s t a r t ed recognizing, on the other hand, the 
coldness with which i t s overtures were met. Despite i t s 
repea ted p roc l ama t ions of ' g e n u i n e n e s s ' of i t s non-
alignment and 'common democra t ic i d e o l o g y ' , the 
appointment of a f r ee e n t e r p r i s e advoca te N.A. 
Palkhiwala as our Ambassador to the US, a u n i l a t e r a l 
declara t ion not to carry on nuclear explosions even for 
peaceful purposes and a considered quiescent neut ra l i sm 
2. Foreign Affai rs Record. Vol. 24, No.5, March 
1977, p . 210. 
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on vital issues in Africa failed to elicit any warm 
response from Washington. New Delhi refused to become 
an object of Washington's 'grand design' but continued 
to bend herself backwards to establish her bonafides 
for US friendship. The result was gradual decline in 
its effectiveness to protect its interests in the Indian 
Ocean and those relating to nuclear energy programmes. 
Fresh developments in South-west Asia and the 
Horn of Africa tended to make the Indian Ocean and Gulf 
region more vulnerable to increase tensions. The 
extension of Soviet influence in what was described by 
the US as the 'arc of crisis', extending from 
Afghanistan to Ethopia, the Islamic revolution in Iran 
and her withdrawal from the role of a 'police man of 
the Gulf and Khomeini's pronounced anti-US stance led 
the US to fresh strategic maneouvres and alignments in 
the Indian Ocean-Gulf area, as against the promise 
President Carter made to Desai the year before. The US 
believed that Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and other Gulf 
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areas needed to be 'saved inspite of themselves'. The US 
new formula for that purpose evolved in February 1979 
included the provision and expansion of a "quick strike 
force" of American para troopers and marines to be used 
in case of a request for help by any of these states. 
This, involved the construction of more port facilities 
at the US base of Diego Garcia and more formidable US 
military presence in the Indian Ocean. China welcomed 
and supported these developments. So did Pakistan. 
These developments directly impinged upon India's geo-
political environment. The government of India, however, 
did not appear to take serious note of the ominous 
developments.-^ Whether it was a short sighted 
calculation to overlook it as a counter weight to Soviet 
influence in the region or an attempt to please the US, 
it was a dangerous complacency at a time when India's 
interests were being seriously threatened. 
West expected a major shift in Indian foreign 
3. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. 24, No. 21, Cols. 278-282, 
March 1977, Government of India, New Delhi. 
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policy after the momentous political changes. Newsweek 
wrote that the new Prime Minister was " a staunch anti-
communist" and "was expected to tilt his non-alignment 
towards the US and the west". Washington Post opined 
that possible changes in Indian foreign policy 
"represent something of a wind fall for Washington".^ 
The defeat of Congress Party had offered "fresh 
opportunities for America".° Arnold L. Horelick opined 
that " The March 1977 elections in India resulting in 
the defeat of the Indira Gandhi government, are likely 
to enhance New Delhi's efforts to maintain a 'better 
balance' between the Soviet Union, China and the US."^  
B.R. Nayar commented that: 
4. "India after Indira", Newsweekly. 4 April 1977, 
p.6. 
5. Washington Post. 22 March, 1977. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Arnold L. Horelick, "Soviet Policy Dilemmas in 
Asia", Asian Survey. Vol. 17, No. 6. 17 June 
1977, p. 505. 
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Even before the elections were completed, 
Morarji Desai told an American 
correspondent who described Desai as one 
'who strongly opposes communism' - that 
as Prime Minister he would immediately 
make a policy declaration that would 
gladden India's friends in the west, 
announcing a return to true non-
alignment and that he would not let the 
Indo-Soviet treaty stand in the way of 
equal friendship with any other power. 
By March 1977, there had already been a change 
of Administration in the US. Jimmy Carter had voiced 
strong feeling for "Human Rights" in his foreign policy 
B.R. Nayar, "India and Super Powers: Deviation 
of Continuity in Foreign Policy", Economic 
and Political Weekly. Vol. 12, No. 30, 23 
July 1977, p. 1185. 
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statements. The Janata Party too, in its election 
manifesto, had announced that it would uphold "Human 
Rights" and would be willing to denounce their violation 
Q 
"whenever and wherever it might occur". It was hoped 
that restoration of " civil liberties" and its 
commitment to democratic values would bring happier 
times for Indo-US ties because of common commitment to 
shared political values after their respective " 
trauma". 
Both Morarj i Desai and Jimmy Carter tried to 
establish a rapport by personal correspondence. The 
Carter administration showed full satisfaction with the 
direction of non-alignment as professed by the Janata 
Party. It showed interest in resuming bilateral aid to 
India^° 
9. For the text of Janata Party's election 
manifesto, See The Indian Express. New Delhi, 
11 February 1977. 
10. The Times of India. New Delhi, 11 April, 1977. 
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The restoration of democratic set up and civil 
liberties through the Lok Sabha elections in March 1977 
has greatly enhanced the prestige of this country in the 
eyes of an average American. Now the atmosphere was 
congenial for both the US and India to strengthen their 
bilateral relations on the basis of mutual understanding 
and co-operation. President Carter told Morarji Desia in 
a message of greetings on his elections as Prime 
Minister that he was looking forward to co-operate with 
him to strengthen the relations between the two 
countries. The message further said: 
"There is much we can do together in 
promoting our shared goals of global 
peace, justice and economic progress. The 
reaffirmation of the democratic process 
in India through a free, open and 
vigorous election has been an inspiration 
to Americans and to people in all parts 
of the world."^^ 
11. The Indian Express. New Delhi, 29 March, 1977. 
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There had been high level exchange of visits 
between India and US during Janata period. The The US 
deputy secretary of States, Warren Christopher visited 
India in July, 1977. He held a series of discussion 
with the Indian leaders on nuclear proliferation. 
Commerce and private investments. He felt that India and 
US were "on the verge of a new era of close and friendly 
relations". The visit of the then Indian Finance 
Minister H.M. Patel and Commerce Minister Mohan Dharia 
to the US on a reciprocal basis have indicated that co-
operation in the field of Commerce is imperative to 
further the cause of friendship between the two 
countries. The acceptance of the then Foreign Minister 
Atal Behari Vajpayee's assertion of India desire for 
"Genuine non-alignment" and the extension of invitation 
to Prime Minister Morarji Desai to visit USA indicate 
that both countries were seriously thinking to advance 
their hitherto subdued relationship. 
American President Jimmy Carter paid a state 
visit to India from l to 3 January 1978, and was in 
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almost all respects a highly successful exercise in 
personal presidential diplomacy. While in New Delhi, he 
stated that "the world's two largest democracies -
India and the US - were bound together by a common 
belief in basic moral values and respect for the human 
spirit ".•'•^  Morarji Desai reciprocated by saying that 
with Carter's visit "unbreakable bonds of friendship 
would be established between the two countries". 
The then Indian President Sanjiva Reddy declared in his 
welcome speech that Carter's stay in India would 
provide an opportunity for free and frank discussions 
and would become "a catalyst for establishing a clear 
rapport and understanding between the leaders of our two 
1 4 
governments". 
As the intended culmination of their meetings, 
the US President and the Indian Prime Minister signed a 
12. The Hindustan Times. 2 January, 1978. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Asian Recorder. 26-28 January 1978, p. 14129. 
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previously agreed-upon Delhi Declaration, high-minded 
statement of principles, it affirmed "an unwavering 
faith in the democratic form of government", the "right 
of each people to determine its own form of government 
and each nation its own political, social and economic 
policies", committed both nations to the reduction and 
eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and called 
also for a more equitable economic order. All in all 
at the termination of the President's visit to Delhi and 
for the later part of the next two years the US Indian 
relations appeared to be marked by broadly shared 
objectives, mutual respect, and good understanding, even 
though relations were also "thin" below the levels of 
the broad principles and personal diplomacy. That is 
to say relations lacked what has been called the 
hardware of diplomacy namely much commercial, trade or 
other economic substance. Common national security 
interests and arms supply relationships were also 
missing. 
15. Jimmy Carter, Public Papers. 1977, pp. 17-18 
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President Jitnmy Carter in a key note address to 
the members of parliament on 2 January 1978 expressed 
profound sentiments of friendship towards India when 
he said : " I came to you as a national leader in the 
hope that my visit will mark a new and high stage in the 
steadily improving relations between our two countries. 
But a more personal sense a sense that is very close 
to my heart - I came as a pilgrim". While a admitting 
the difference in approach to the bilateral issues, 
Jimmy Carter said: " I know that there will be times we 
will disagree on specific issues and even on general 
approaches to larger problems. But I hope and believe 
that our shared interests and common devotion to 
democratic values will help us move towards agreement 
an important global and bilateral issues". As regards 
the main irritants like nuclear proliferation and Indian 
ocean, president Carter declared: " We are also working 
hard to restrict, the proliferation of nuclear 
explosives. We are seeking to help the process of peace 
78 
in Africa and the middle East. And we are taking steps 
to forestall great power rivalry in the Indian 
Ocean".^^ 
However, neither president Carter's, address to 
the parliament nor the declaration issued at the end of 
his visit suggested any concrete measure to solve the 
outstanding problems that existed between India and 
American, particularly in relations to Diego Garcia and 
nuclear proliferation. Prime Minister Desai's firm 
attitude on not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty unless nuclear powers abandon their military 
proliferation and his refusal to inspection of Tarapur 
and Rana Pratap Sagar Plants was viewed in the US 
official circles as a great setback to the process of 
normalization of Indo-US relations-'-'^ . 
16. See for details, president Jimmy Carter's 
Address the the Indian Parliament, Indian 
Express. New Delhi, 3 January, 1978. 
17. Iqbal Khanam, "Indo-American Relations", Third 
Concept. New Delhi, August 1995. 
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The joint communique signed by India and the US 
listed many common foreign policy objectives of both 
the countries. First, both recognized that "ultimate 
sanction of power and of public policy" rest in the 
respect for "dignity and well being of the 
individuals". Secondly, the two leaders were gratified 
that the "process of decolonization" gave most of the 
countries a chance to participate in making decisions 
about global peace and co-operation. Thirdly, both 
emphasized the need for removing global economic 
disparities for achieving international peace 
stability. Fourthly, the communique called for global 
co-operation for the protection and development of the 
world's resources and environment. Fifthly, both leaders 
noted that "war is not an acceptable mean to settle 
political disputes". Both emphasised that they would 
solve their international disputes amicably and "within 
the framework of the United Nations." Finally, both 
required the reduction and eventual elimination of 
nuclear stock piles. They also emphasised the need for 
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averting "the danger of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons" .•'•® Later on, Jimmy Carter said that in India, 
he found "a genuine feeling of compatibility and 
friendship based on deep religious convictions, a 
commitment to democracy, the principle of human 
rights".^^ 
Notwithstanding the pious hopes of the 
declaration which were belied by the subsequent events, 
the two countries failed to agree on the nuclear 
question. In spite of the American anxiety in this 
regard, the two countries differed on this issue.^^ 
Rather, President Jimmy Carter got irritated and was 
reported to have told secretary of state Cyrus vance 
that "when we get back, I think we should write to him 
18. The Hindustan Times. 4 January 1978. 
19. Ibid. 8 January 1978. 
20. Swadesh Rana, "President Carter's visit to 
India", Strategic Analysis. Vol.1, No.10, 
January 1978, p.5. 
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(Mr. Desai) another letter just cold and very 
blunt."2^ 
Of course, publicly it was maintained that 
understanding had been reached. For instance, on 2 
January 1978, at their joint press briefing, American 
President's press Secretary, Jody Powell and India's 
foreign Secretary, Jagat Mehta, stated that there was 
no difference on the issues of nuclear weapons and of 
nuclear safeguards. The decision by the Indo-US joint 
Commission to establish an industrial working group to 
undertake joint discussions and research in various 
fields did not result in any concrete proposal for 
promoting mutual economic ties. The trade talks held in 
Washington, on 29 and 30 January 1978, also failed to 
produce any substantial results. When the Indian side 
requested "favourable and appropriate action"^^ for the 
enhancement of Indian exports, the US countered "by 
21. The Hindustan Times, 3 January 1978. 
22. Asian Recorder. 19-25 March 1978, p. 14225, 
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voicing concern about a number of aspects of India's own 
0-3. 
export policies". 
The differences persisted between the two 
countries on the issue of comprehensive safeguards and 
supply of enriched uranium by the US to India. It 
become clear when, on 21 April 1978, Nuclear Regulatory 
commission (NRC) of America turned down India's plea 
for replenishment of nuclear fuel for Tarapur power 
station. This was the first time that three years old 
NRC turned down a nuclear export licence. Justifying 
its action, the NRC cited the US Law, the Nuclear 
Non proliferation Act," for its refusal to honour the 
contractual obligation to supply the fuel for the plant 
the US had sold to India".^^ These safeguards involved 
periodic and rigorous inspection under the protection of 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 
23. Ibid. 
24. The Tribune. Chandigarh. 22 April 1978. 
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This was greatly resented by India. Morarji 
Desai termed it as " breach" of the agreement of 
cooperation (1963), and the contract of 1966. He 
insisted," under the provisions of the contract, the US 
Government was bound to provide India with all the fuel 
for Tarapur upto 1994."^^ He, however, regretted that 
even the promise made by Jimmy Carter in January 1978 
does not appear to have weighted with the Nuclear 
Regulatory commission in its deliberations over the 
matter."^^ 
In June 1978, Morarji Desai visited the USA as a 
part of his broader diplomatic voyage of Belgium, 
England and USA. On arriving in Washington on 12 June 
1978, he held talk with President Jimmy Carter and many 
other important dignitaries. Earlier, Morarji Desai has 
said that he was going to USA "with a feeling of deep 
25. Ibid. 25 April 1978. 
26. Asian Recorder. 4-10 June 1978, p. 14348. 
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satisfaction that our bilateral relations are so much 
closer than they have been for some times in the 
past".^'' Jimmy Carter also remarked that "there is no 
conflict or clash of fundamental interests between 
US". ° Apart from other issues, the question of nuclear 
non-proliferation and supply of enriched uranium also 
got top priority. Morarji Desai "gave the assurance 
that India would not manufacture nuclear weapons even 
9 Q 
xf It perished." ^ But he made it clear that " India 
considered the full scope safeguards discriminatory by 
nature. "-^^ 
On 26 August 1978, America resumed development 
assistance to India with a commitment of $60 million 
27. The Tribune. Chandigarh, 14 June 1987. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Asian Recorder. 9-15 July 1968, p. 14398 
30. Ibid. 
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covered by three separate agreements signed in New 
Delhi.-^^ It is pertinent to point out that earlier 
aid was suspended by the Nixon administration in the 
wake of * South Asian crisis' of 1971. As the major 
issue that was straining the mutual ties was related to 
nuclear proliferation and shipment of enriched uranium. 
An important area of differences, as already 
hinted, was in regard to the question of nuclear 
weapons and the related question of shipment of 
SAmerican enriched-uranium for Tarapur Atomic Power 
Station. No doubt, the Janata Government had 
restricted its options on this issue. On 13 June 1977, 
Morarji Desai declared in the Lok Sabha that "India 
would not undertake any more nuclear explosions" even 
for peaceful purposes.^^ On 5 January 1978, he told a 
delegation of American Senators that " no matter what 
31. Ibid. 
32. Asian Recorder. 13-19 August 1977, P. 13879. 
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33 
any other did, she would never have atomic weapons". 
But the Americans were not satisfied with Indian 
declarations. The US wanted India to accept nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and to accept "comprehensive 
safeguard's on her nuclear installations. These 
comprehensive safegxiards could enable the US to have 
veto on India's future nuclear planning. But India was 
not prepared to accept either non proliferation treaty 
or comprehensive safeguards. 
The US continued to be suspicious of India's 
nuclear advances more particularly till the Janata 
Government in India clearly declared its nuclear 
proliferation policy. Prime Minister Morarji Desai 
categorically stated that India would not manufacture 
nuclear weapons for defence although China possessed 
them and Pakistan was frantically trying to get the 
same. He out lined for the first time Janata 
33. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 7 January 1978 
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Government's nuclear policy at a press conference in New 
Delhi on 16 May 1977. In an unequivocal rejection of 
nuclear weapons, Morarji Desai said, "Such weapons were 
no good for defence,- they were meant only for 
destruction. To defend itself, the country needs 
conventional weaponry, 'conventional army' and ' courage 
of the people'. Since nuclear weapons would only destroy 
the world, they should be removed from the earth. If we 
go on saying to every body that such weapons are bad, 
should be take to them"? Prime Minister Morarji Desai 
in the same press conference went on to add that India 
would not sign the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty 
unless all those who have atomic weapons give them up.^^ 
This was perhaps the kind of policy statement 
for which the White House was looking from the 
Government of India. The Carter administration after 
having examined Prime Minister Morarji Desai's 
34. The Times of India. New Delhi, 17 May 1977. 
88 
statement decided to supply uranium to meet several 
months needs of the Tarapur Plant on the condition that 
the two countries start broad talks on their future 
nuclear relations. Joseph Nye State Departmetn's Senior 
Nuclear expert told the Senate Foreign Relations sub-
committee that the United States is prepared to 
negotiate with India a wide variety of objectives in the 
non-proliferation field. 
The external affairs Minister, Atal Behari 
Vajpayee who led the Indian delegation to the " North-
South Dialogue" in Paris in June, 1977 told French Prime 
Minister Raymond Barre that the Indian Government had 
unilaterally decided not to manufacture atomic weapons. 
The development of nuclear energy was only for peaceful 
purposes. Barre expressed the desire of the French 
Government to supply nuclear technology to developing 
countries for development purposes. However, he 
35. The Indian Express. New Delhi, 27 May 1977. 
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emphasised that French would opposed proliferation for 
atomic weapons. 
At the common wealth conference in London, Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai met Primier Pierre Trudeau of 
Canada and appraised him of the nuclear proliferation 
policy of his Government. After the Commonwealth 
conference in London Morarj i Desai said in a interview 
to the Bonn conservative Daily, Die welt that he would 
resign if India manufactured an atom bomb, he met the 
French Persident, Giscard Estating and Prime Minister 
Raymond Bar re in Paris on his way back home in June 
1977. He reiterated his Government's intention to 
explore atomic energy for peaceful purposes. He 
emphasised in the interview in Paris that "I will give 
it to you in writing that we will not manufacture 
nuclear weapons. Even if the whole world arms itself 
with the atombombs, we will not to do so".-^ "^  
36. The Statesman. New Delhi, 3, June 1977, 26 May 
1977. 
37. The Hindu, Madras, 21 June 1977. 
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These statements of the Prime Minister and the 
external affairs minister gave an added impetus to the 
US to supply enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur 
Atomic Power Plant."^° 
Prime Minister Morarji Desai declared in the Lok 
Sabha on 13 July 1977 that the licence for 12 tonnes of 
enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station 
had been cleared on 29 June 1977 by the US 
administration and consignment was shortly expected. 
During the debate on the US supply of uranium in the 
Lok Sabha, Morarji Desai informed Jyotirmoy Bosu 
(CPIM), G.M. Banatwala(ML), CK Chandrappan (CPI) and 
others that: "The US Nuclear Regulatory commission had 
directed the issuance of the pending export licence 
DSNM-845, authorizing the shipment of enriched uranium 
fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Station. There is no 
preconditions as such but there is an understanding that 
38. Hong Kong Standard. Hong Kong, 23 June, 1977. 
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discussion would be held between US and India on the 
39 larger questions of nuclear proliferation."-^^ 
During the initial stage, the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission had blocked the shipment of 
uranium fuel to India on the ground that its 
proliferation would effect the environment adversely 
and at the same time it would encourage other nations 
to follow India's course. But the state Department made 
a strong appeal to the Nuclear Regulatory commission 
that the export licence for the shipment of the second 
installment of enriched uranium to India for the 
Tarapur Atomic Power Plant should be allowed without any 
preconditions. The NRC ultimately agreed to issue export 
licence for shipment of enriched uranium to India. 
In the meanwhile, victor Gelinsky, the US 
commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory commission had 
spelt out the conditions under which future shipments 
39. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 14 July 1977 
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of nuclear fuel to India's Tarapur Plant should be made. 
While approving the shipment Gilinsky said: "The Indian 
Government understands that permission to extract 
platinum from the Tarapur spent fuel will not be 
forthcoming. It is further my understanding that the 
state department has informed the Indian Government that 
it will recommend against further shipment of fuel 
should India explode another nuclear device". He further 
said that serious problems remained and "there is 
little reason to be Sanguine about the licensing 
action" because India continues to maintain in its 
claim for fuel that there is difference between 
"peaceful" nuclear device and a nuclear weapon".'*^ 
The American nuclear experts and intelligentsia 
was well aware of the nuclear capability of India and 
it is also known to them that it is beyond the means of 
India to attain nuclear parity with the US in the near 
40. The Times of India. New Delhi, 15 and 16 July 
1977. 
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future, yet, the US public and press got alarmed and 
lashed out at the truffle Indian blast. This is in fact 
had an adverse impact on Indo American relations. 
However, Prime Minister Desai's repeated utterance that 
India does not believe in the manufacturing of nuclear 
weapons had appreciated by the US administration. There 
was great similarity of views between Prime Minister 
Morarji Desai and President Jimmy Carter on anti-
proliferation policy both at home and elsewhere in the 
world. The emphasis on the use of nuclear energy 
exclusively for civil purposes may help other nations 
'izake a direction and discourage the manufacturing of 
nuclear weapons. 
Another important factor which widened the gap 
between the US and India during Janata regime was 
the former's renewed military aid to Pakistan. It was 
hoped in India that its relations with the USA would 
improve, with the coming of Democrats in the USA and 
Carter became the President in 1977. This optimism in 
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India was due to Democrat's known unfavourable view on 
arms sale and nuclear proliferation. Much to Indian 
satisfaction American Government on 7 April 1979 in 
conformity with section 669 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 or what is more commonly known as the 
Symington Amendment, suspended all economic and 
military assistance to Pakistan, 
Infact the US was confronted with the policy 
dilemma on the one hand, given Pakistan's strategic 
importance on account of development in Afghanistan and 
Iran it sought to assist Pakistan in developing essence 
of self confidence and security, and on the other, it 
could not abandon its non-proliferation objective. At 
the same time, the Carter Administration did not want 
to Jeopardise the "extremely warm and positive 
relationship" with India especially after Carter's 
visit to India in January 1978. 
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan towards 
the end of December 1979 and the fall of the Shah in 
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Iran, a strong American ally in west Asia, brought 
about a dramatic change in the situation and led 
American policy makers to "rediscover" the strategic 
importance of Pakistan. As a frontline state, Pakistan 
now became "an essential line of defence and an 
indispensable element of any strategy that sought to 
punish the Soviet for their action". In its efforts to 
re-establish military and Security ties with the 
Pakistani Government, the Carter Administration even 
override its nuclear concerns, which he had inhibited 
it so much in the past but came forward with an offer of 
$400 million aid which Ziaul Hague shrewdly rejected as 
'peanuts' . The American decision to supply arms to 
Pakistan was strongly resented in India and it once 
again brought "the black cloud" over the Indo-US 
relations which some what had strated improving with 
the coming of Carter in power in the US. 
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JndO'AnteticaH Kelations in 1980 
In January 1980 the world's largest democratic 
elections returned Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the position of 
Prime Minister of India by a decisive vote as that 
which had swept her out of power in March 1977. Mrs. 
Gandhi back to power aroused strong feelings of hope 
and dismay - both in India and in nations connected 
intimately with it. Expectations ran high that she 
would provide to a stable Government to solve the 
problems of the country.'^  She was also expected to play 
an active role in world affairs, which were fraught 
with political and economic tensions of crisis 
proportions. 
Her return to power had an immediate impact on 
the external domain. The most volatile crises of the day 
were centered in India's geographical vicinity and 
1. Data India. New Delhi, January 1980, p. 13. 
2. One of the Slogans used by the Congress (I) 
during the Election Campaign in 1980. 
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directly affected its interests. The opinion of the 
Indian Government on actual or incipient conflicts in 
Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Indian ocean, or the 
mainland of Southeast Asia could not be ignored by the 
other small countries in the region, by China or even by 
the two global powers, the United States of America and 
the former Soviet Union. Any possibility of India's 
views being peresumed, or submerged, in an Afro-Asian 
conglomeration, was ruled out by the active diplomacy 
conducted by Mrs. Gandhi's new Government. This was 
first signalled by India's Ambassador to the United 
Nations. Briiesh Mishra, speaking in the General 
Assembly on the Afghan crisis on 10 January 1980. 
Under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership, India's approach 
to the US has been three stranded. One has been to win 
support for India's most vital interests in security, 
international independence and economic development. 
Another strand has been persistence in policies to 
further its basic goals even in the absence of US 
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support or in the face of US opposition. The third has 
been the preservation of cordial and fruitful 
bilateral relations in areas of mutual interest and 
attempts to insulate them from other disagreements. 
High hopes were invested in the personal 
rapport between Prime Minister Morarji Desai and 
President Jimmy Carter, but to little avail. During 
1980-82, Mrs. Gandhi's new government maintained a 
steady dialogue with Washington, while the situation in 
South-west Asia threw all bilateral problems into sharp 
relief. Her position on the former Soviet military 
occupation of Afghanistan changed appreciably over the 
year from sympathetic under standing to criticism of 
the former Soviet move. Her opposition to the 
escalation of US naval and military presence in the 
region remained constant. -^  
3. Surjit Man Singh, India's Search for Power; 
Indira Gandhi foreign Policy 1966-1982. Sage 
Publications, New Delhi, 1984, PP. 70-71, 
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Mrs. Gandhi's moves towards the USA have been 
consistent with her pragmatism and her acceptance of 
oscillation in all relationships. India's policy of non-
alignment demanded cordial relations with both the US 
and the former Soviet Union. The lacunae in India's 
economic and technological development could best be 
filled from the west. India sought the sympathy and 
cooperation of America in its international campaigns 
against racism and for the amelioration of human 
beings. At the same time, Indira Gandhi's overtures to 
the US have always been inhibited. Her natural reserve 
of conduct and herself confessed inability to * express 
gratitude in any tangible manner', have frequently been 
interpreted as 'coldness' and 'toughness' in the more 
exuberant American culture.'* Her own experiences as well 
as those of her predecessors led to suspicions of US 
intentions which she was quick to voice. Above all, her 
pride was often hurt. Neither in personal nor public 
Indira Gandhi's Interview to C.L. Sulzberger in 
New York Times. 18 February 1972. 
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l i f e did Indira Gandhi willingly accept a relat ionship 
of subordination. She was not offered equa l i t y by 
Johnson or Nixon. Deprived of forthright reassurance at 
her own leve l , and with her a t t e n t i o n drawn to 
revelation about convert US ac t iv i t i e s in various parts 
of the world, Mrs. Gandhi wondered why the US was 
de s t ab i l i s i ng her government or i n c i t i n g an t i - Ind i an 
sentiment in the region .^ Her public statements 
i r r i t a t ed Washington and further reduced her chances of 
receiving favourable at tention from the US. 
No survey of Indo-American relat ions can hope to 
do j u s t i c e to the complex i n t e r ac t i ons between the 
world's two largest democracies. This chapter will 
focus on three important facts of relat ionship. First , 
i t will discuss the divergence in s t rategic perspectives 
5. Ambassador William B. Saxbe protested against 
some of the Prime Min i s t e r ' s Statements as 
reported in the overseas Hindustan Times 
(referred to hereafter as OHT), 26 September 
1974. 
101 
which prevented the formation of an otherwise logical 
partnership in the world affairs. The two countries had 
sharp differences on Pakistan, west-Asia, the Indian 
ocean and other areas where US military policies were 
opposed by India. Secondly, It will take up the nuclear 
question as an irritant in Indo- US relations. Third, 
it will survey bilateral economic dealings as the major 
link in the period under review.° 
The international strategic environment moulded 
Indo-American relations. A question relevant for both 
Governments was whether each could define its 
political and military policies without encroaching on 
the other's interests and further, whether any 
compatibility of interests and policies could be 
formally recognized. The record of three decades shows 
that despite declared common interests in the peace 
and stability of Southern Asia, the two countries found 
collaboration extremely difficult. They did not agree on 
6. Surjit Man Singh, n.3, p. 72. 
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the best methods of ensuring stability and they 
perceived threats to peace differently. This lack of 
cottimonalty in strategic perceptions arose from their 
different historical experiences and geographical 
locations rather than from ideological cleavages. The 
differences were most obvious with respect to the 
former Soviet Union, China and Pakistan. The policies 
that India and the US adopted toward these three 
countries changed over the years and the differences in 
their respective approaches were always striking. 
From India's standpoint there was no doubt 
that the military support provided by America to 
Pakistan - as distinct from economic assistance to 
another developing country - was the major obstacle to 
improve Indo-American relations. Further, Mrs. Gandhi's 
governments regarded outside military assistance to 
Pakistan as the most important impediment to 
normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. 
She reasoned that successive military regimes in 
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Pakistan were encourage to be intransigent with India 
because foreign arms blinded them to the realities of 
the power balance on the subcontinent which should have 
prompted them to accommodate with India. Washington did 
not accept this argument. 
The differences in Indian and American 
perspectives on South-east Asia surfaced again in 1980 
on the issue of which government should be recognized 
as the legitimate one in Cambodia. India's support to 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, its economic 
assistance and recognition to Heng Samrin government 
installed by it in Cambodia. This policy was based on 
the conviction that India's interests were based served 
by cooperation with other middle powers, such as 
Vietnam, and by offering a third path to new countries, 
rather than by acquiescing in great power domination of 
smaller powers. From this point of view the failure of 
the US to normalize its post-war relations with Vietnam 
and assist in ameliorating Vietnam desperate economic 
plight and its support for the Bejing - oriented 
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Pol Pot regime and the Khmer Rouge in cambodia, only-
pushed Vietnam towards an undesirable dependence on the 
former Soviet Union and gave the appearance of 
delineating mainland South-east Asia as a Chinese sphere 
of influence. 
Differences over West Asia had as deep an 
effect on Indo-American relations as did differences on 
South-east Asia. Long before the world energy problems 
of the 1970s and 1980s propelled the Arab Oil producing 
states into international prominence, India's interests 
had been linked with the Islamic states by history, 
Geographic proximity, trade and communication routes 
and strong sentiments of Asian and Arab nationalism. 
Israel had posed a dilemma for India since its 
inception, a dilemma which New Delhi found impossible to 
resolve. India recognised the existence and legitimate 
security needs of Israel but wasn't prepared to raise 
its diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level or 
to condone Israeli militancy. Despite an active Israeli 
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consulate in Bombay and an anti Musim lobby, India 
identified more and more with the Arab stand on 
Palestine. It encouraged the participation of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in international 
negotiation over west Asia even though the PLO lacked 
the territorial base and legal trappings of a 
government. India also accorded diplomatic status to the 
PLO m 1980. 
American policies in West Asia, as in South 
Asia, abounded with dilemmas complexities and conflicts. 
There was no doubt, however, of the strong US commitment 
to Israel. The pro-Israeli Sentiment was also very 
evident in the US Congress and among the makers of US 
public opinion, be they Christian or Jews, liberal or 
conservative. India's ambivalence on Israel attracted 
far stronger American disapproval than that shown to any 
other country (such as Pakistan) with a similar stand 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indira Gandhi believed 
this to be an important reason for the unsympathetic 
press which India received in the US. Ambassador Saxbe 
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angrily announced that this nonsense about the PLO 
has to stop. 
Differences of approach to third party disputes 
could, perhaps, have been tolerated by an Indo-US 
relationship based on mutual respect for each others 
position and mutual trust in each others intent. These 
conditions however, were lacking in Indo-American 
relations. New Delhi could not comprehend the repeated 
rearmament of Pakistan by the USA except in terms of 
mala fide intent. Washington did not forgive India's 
reliance on the former Soviet Union and was not 
prepared to offer the means of diminishing this 
reliance. Thus US arms supplies to Pakistan and Soviet 
arms supplies to India became the main sticking points 
in Indo-Us relations. 
When President Carter's offer of military 
assistance of 1980 to Pakistan was upgraded by the 
7. Washington Post. 19 March 1975. 
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Regan Administration in 1981. Scarcely a day passed 
without major Indian newspapers running stories on US 
arms and possible military bases in Pakistan. An Indian 
sky full of invading F-16 aircraft was the picture 
presented in the press. What effect this Indian 
opposition (bitter, loud and sustained) had on the 
Regan Administration is not certain whether American 
critics of Regan's new policy collaboration with 
Pakistan were helped or hindered by New Delhi's 
indignation. However, efforts were made on both sides 
to overcome the problem. In 1982 Mrs. Gandhi seemed 
less worried about the new US-Pakistan relationship, 
partly because this was slow to mature and partly 
because the continued presence of Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan spurred on a slow but steady process of 
normalization in Indo-Pakistan relations. 
President Carter's initial policy towards the 
subcontinent had been to establish a rapport with the 
Janata Government in India. His administration resumed 
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a bilateral economic aid programme to India. It also 
welcomed Indian inquiries concerning sophisticated 
defence equipment from USA. Negotiations were initiated 
by India for the purchase of TOW anti-tank missiles and 
light howitzer guns from the US. The Indian army found 
these items superior to similar equipment produced 
elsewhere in terms of suitability, performance, and 
price. However, neither the Janata Government nor that 
of Mrs. Gandhi, was prepared to compromise the standard 
Indian demands for a license to manufacture the 
concerned equipment and assurances of sustained supplies 
of ammunition and spare parts. India's demands were, 
however, incompatible with the American approach to 
dealings with non-allied countries. The kind of licenses 
demanded by India mainly, that its public sector 
defence industries be allowed to manufacture items 
produced by private American Corporations had always 
been denied by America. Given the ideological 
complexion of the Regan Administration, it was likely to 
prove a continuing obstacle. The Carter Administration 
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sold $32 million worth of TOW anti-tank missiles to 
India in June 1980 and defended its decision before the 
senate.^ But consummation of the sale foundred in 1981 
on the issue of manufacture in India. Since the US was 
unwilling to guarantee more than a twenty day supply of 
ammunition at a time, it appeared as if the howitzers 
too would not be purchased by India after all. 
During the Janata period efforts were made to 
improve the relations with the US. However, a fruitful 
relationship could not be established because there was 
no meshing of expectations and no reconciliation of 
well established national on vital issues. The nuclear 
issue, could not be resolved by Carter and Desai despite 
their obvious desired to accomodate each others view 
point. On economic issue, expectation of each side 
outstripped the others capacity to meet them, whether in 
the amount of foreign assistance forthcoming from the 
Tarapur Nuclear Fuel Export; Report of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. United State 
Senate, 15 September 1980, p.14. 
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us or New Delhi's dismantling of domestic economic 
controls. The clash between India's foreign exchange 
regulations as applicable to private foreign capital 
and the two American giants of the international 
corporate world, cocacola and IBM, was not a small 
event. The dream of the most powerful and the most 
populous democracies in the world working together 
remained at the inspirational level only. In 1979, when 
Carter reversed his foreign policy priorities from human 
rights, back to national security, American and Indian 
strategic perceptions clashed once again. As discussed 
earlier, differences on the Afghanistan situation 
dominated the last year of the Carter Administration 
and the first year of Mrs. Gandhi's return to power. 
In 1981-82 Mrs. Gandhi and President Ronald 
Regan made efforts to surmount their differences. Their 
meeting at Cancun produced smiles, if nothing else , 
which percolated down words. Their Governments set about 
the task of improving bilateral relations by first 
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limiting the effects of the existing damage and then 
seeking non-controversial areas of matching interests 
where cooperation could be encouraged. At the same time, 
they avoided raising popular hopes for instant 
gratification of desires on either side. Two 
hardworking, unprovocative, sincere but unsentimental 
Ambassadors personified this new phase, K.R. Naraynan in 




At the time of independence India had a 
favourable impression of America as the Champion of 
freedom, because of President Roosevell's role in Indian 
independence during World War II. It was expected that 
common values and objectives faith in democratic 
institutions and democratic way of life, dedication to 
the cause of peace and freedom - would form the bedrock 
on which the relations between the two countries would 
be based. But as the national interests of the United 
States and India came to be clearly defined, the 
initial emotional attachment was replaced by disenchant. 
Conflict between the two countries was inevitable as 
both interpreted their national interests differently. 
India believed that its interests could be best served 
by pursuing a non-aligned policy, i.e, the policy of not 
joining either of the power blocs, since India needed 
peace and aid from all countries for all round 
development of the country. But to America the 
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immediate danger to its security arose from the 
expansionist policies of communist Russia. Therefore, 
it was busy gaining allies and concluding military 
pacts with other countries to contain communist 
expansionism. Hence, it could not approve of India's 
policy of non-alignment which was dubbed as 'immoral' by 
American secretary of State Dulles. 
Thus while ignorance and prejudice on both sides 
gave relations a bad start, a real clash of interests 
soon made them worse. No amount of aid could balance 
the danger posed against as by Pakistan's alliance with 
America, and India's counter move of cooperation with 
the USSR was misconstrued to aiden the distance with 
USA. True, what started us on the wrong side of each 
other was America's effort to use part of the 
subcontinent as an out post in the contention of 
advantage between itself and the USSR, and what kept 
widening the Gulf was not only individual issues, from 
Arab-Israel conflict to Vietnam, but the entire world 
view which sharpened those individual differences. 
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In America's cold war obsessions, India seemed 
a nuisance, to be neutralised as far as possible, if 
necessary be set aside if not totally ignored, while in 
India we have developed a climate of opinion in which 
it became positively unpatriotic even to think of 
America in cooperative terms. 
So far as our study period is concerned, the 
Bangladesh issue was the most significant irritant 
between India and the United States. The Indo-American 
relations touched their all time lowest point in 
November-December 1971, when Bangladesh crisis erupted. 
This war started when the Pakistani military rulers, 
having received assurance from the Nixon 
administration and Peking, being unable to bring the 
situation in Bangladesh under control, and annoyed 
with India's open support to Bangladesh,, bombed eight 
Indian bases on 3 December 1971. In their war, much to 
the disappointment of India. The Nixon administration 
went out of its way to side with Pakistan and showed 
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great hostility to India. It bronded India as aggressor, 
cut all military and economic aid to India, moved three 
resolutions in the security council and in the General 
Assembly in support of Pakistan, Secretly planned the 
supply of US arms and spare parts, in utter disregard of 
public opinion in USA itself, and to crown it all, even 
sent the US talk force (Seventh Fleet) into the Bay of 
Bengal to demonstrate its support to Pakistan and exert 
psychological pressure on India. 
However despite all these provocative acts 
America refrained from direct military intervention in 
the war. But what annoyed India was that the US kept 
silent when Pakistan massed its troops along India's 
western borders and expressed concern only when India 
took counter measures. Thus we see that inspite of 
having strong difference of views there was an 
underlying desire on the part of each not to let 
relations deteriorate further. Perhaps a thaw in 
relations was in the offing. 
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During Mrs. Indira Gandhi reign another issue 
which plunged Indo-American relations was the nuclear 
issue. Sharp differences arose between India and United 
States over the explosion of a nuclear device by 
India at Pokharan in Rajasthan on 18 May 1974. Both the 
American official and press were outraged by the 
Pokharan experiment and reacted rather angrily to the 
so-called nuclear proliferation. The US news media, the 
conservatives, the liberals, the writers, the 
cartoonist and commentators condemned India for its over 
ambitious and audacious move. They regarded it an 
"immoral and political sins". 'national hypocrisy' 
callous endangerment of humanity". 
Although it was recognised by US that India had 
not technically ' violated the spirit of the Tarapur 
agreement, the Ford and later the Carter Administration 
took a vary strict view of the problem posed by nuclear 
proliferation. The explosion was used by Americans to 
impose restrictions on fuel supplies to India. Prime 
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Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi repeated assurances that 
she will use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes 
were not taken seriously by the Americans. The 
Indians, for their part, interpreted the embargo to 
wean out-right tearing of a solemn agreement . The 
United States had entered into an agreement of 
cooperation with India in 1963 to supply enriched 
uranium for over 3 0 years (upto 1994) to Tarapur Atomic 
Power Station. 
Since the explosion of a nuclear device by 
India, fuel supplies from the US have been irregular. 
One consignment due in March 1976 was cleared in May, 
with only nine out of 21 tonnes applied for cleared and 
the shipment of the rest delayed until December 1976 
pending further hearing by NRC (Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission) . 
With the Jimmy Carter assuming Presidentship in 
1975-76 in the US and the Janata Party coming to power 
in India in 1977, a new phase in Indo-American 
118 
relations was heralded. Indians regarded Carter as 
another Kennedy. The Janata Government declared its 
intention of adopting genuine non-alignment. This meant 
that earlier policy of a tilt towards the Soviet Union 
would be restructured so as to establish more cordial 
relations between India and America. President Carter 
also expressed his desire for closer relations with 
India. This was exemplified by his recognition of 
India's regional power status. He even visited India 
to make the Indian Public opinion more sympathetic to 
the United States. 
By 1980, with both Janata Party and Jimmy 
Carter no longer in office, Indo-American relations once 
again took a turn for the worse. This phase of cordial 
relations was not only due to the interplay of 
responsibilities but because during this period the 
global and regional perspectives of both India and 
America coincided. 
With President Reagan in power in the US and 
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Mrs. Indira Gandhi in India, the rift between India and 
America began to widen. The differing perceptions of 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the fall of 
the Shah of Iran further exorbited tension between the 
two countries, as the US world view took on a new 
perspective. The Reagan Administration's decision to 
supply arms to Pakistan means reinforcing India's image 
of a hostile America. Knowing well that their policies 
in the subcontinent had driven India and America 
further apart, they were ready to pay the price 
because advantages of these policies appear to them to 
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